It has been a little more than two months since Pine Lawn Police Chief Rickey Collins began enforcing the anti-sagging ordinance that the municipality’s aldermen passed. According to the Post-Dispatch, “The ordinance calls for fines of up to $100 for those 17 and older who wear pants below the waist that expose underwear or skin. [...] Parents of those 16 and under face up to a $500 fine or 90 days in jail if they knowingly allow their children to wear pants in such a manner.”

Personally, I think sagging is uncongenial, representing the antithesis of a gentleman. Despite my views, I believe that government does not have the right to enforce family values by acting like the fashion police. Besides being difficult to implement and patrol, this policy is also unconstitutional. There are many forms of expression that are not protected by the First Amendment, such as fighting words, libel, commercial speech, and obscenity. While some try to place sagging under the umbrella of obscenity, it would be relevant to put it through the “Miller Test,” which is the standard for determining whether material is obscene. In the 1973 case of Miller v. California, the Supreme Court ruled that material is legally obscene if:

1. The average person, applying contemporary community standards, would conclude that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests.
2. It depicts sexually explicit conduct, specifically defined by law, in a patently offensive manner.
3. It lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

I believe tha sagging passes the ‘Miller Test’ with flying colors. For young people who are part of our country’s inner-city hip hop culture, it is a form of rebellion and identity. To some, it is just plain fashionable. This ordinance in Pine Lawn is just another example of how our liberty and freedom of expression are in danger today.

Other cities around the country, most recently Flint, Mich., are also taking stride to incorporate the same ordinance in their efforts to restore family values and ethics. I do applaud the importance of ethics in American society, but how ethical is it for government to deny our freedom of expression?

A few weeks ago, I pointed out that cities across the state were creating a war chest to try to prevent Missouri’s voters from ending the eminent domain abuse that currently threatens our right to keep what rightfully belongs to us. Shortly thereafter, the secretary of state ruled that, despite the hundreds of thousands of signatures turned in by Missouri Citizens for Property Rights (MO-CPR) in support of their proposed constitutional amendments, the issue would not be on the November ballot.

Last week, MO-CPR filed a lawsuit challenging the secretary of state’s decision and asking the court to allow citizens to have their say on the issue. And, yesterday, the Missouri Municipal League — an organization that collects taxpayer dollars and purports to advance the interests of Missouri’s local governments — moved to block MO-CPR’s lawsuit.

A few choice tidbits from the Municipal League’s filing should allow citizens to evaluate the merits of its “concerns”:

• The league’s members argue that they should be allowed to intervene because they “have exercised the power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring private property for conveyance to private entities for commercial or other development to fight blight and other decay, and it is anticipated that they will continue to do so in the future.”
• The league opposes the amendments because they might require local governments to pay “just compensation for local land use regulations.” In other words, the cities would have to pay you if they passed a regulation that decreased the value of your property. While not included in their filing, a previous Municipal League analysis of the proposed amendments also worried that they would “significantly increase the amounts of condemnation awards” to citizens being dispossessed of their homes and businesses.
• The league is concerned that the amendments would require cities to get a court order before they destroyed or condemned property that they thought was a nuisance. While not mentioned in the league’s filing, the amendment would also require cities to give owners an opportunity to fix the problems themselves. I mean, why in the world should cities allow property owners the chance to remove the government’s pretext for giving their property to someone else? Honestly.
• The league doesn’t like that the amendments would “limit the use of eminent domain to the State or political subdivisions whose officials are directly responsible to elected officials.” This would, of course, allow voters to hold those responsible for using eminent domain accountable for their actions — a radical departure from current law, which allows many unelected, unaccountable organizations to take away private property.
• Despite justifying its involvement in part by complaining that confirming the number of proper signatures will be expensive, the league calls for the court to recount all 400,000+ signatures, not just the ones challenged by MO-CPR.

MO-CPR issued a press release in response to the Municipal League’s filing. Among the excellent points made in the release, my favorite is where Bevis Shock (a member of the Show-Me Institute’s board of directors) asks, “I wonder if the politicians who approved this legal action have considered how many residents of their cities signed our petition?”

If we can make it there … you know the rest.

I am not actually positive that the Manhattan Institutue is in Manhattan, but let’s assume it is. Anyway, its legal scholar, Walter Olson (from the famous overlawyered.com), has a great essay about the strange desire of business groups to favor elections for judges. He includes commentary about the Show-Me Institute study of the Missouri Plan, written by Hall and Sobel this past spring, and links to it. Please check out his commentary and our study. The only small addition I would make to his point is to add Southern Illinois as an example of a state in which elected judges and huge tort verdicts coincide.

You will have to excuse the title- I just watched Karate Kid.

Today’s Kansas City Star has an editorial (link via Combest) discussing Missouri’s judicial selection process. Luckily for us, some think tank in Missouri has already issued a study about the judicial selection process and its superiority to other forms of judicial selection.

Clearly, Eric Dixon played an influential role in yesterday’s Supreme Court decision.

Missouri now becomes the 38th state to legalize the use of a midwife, certified by a private entity.

In the Post-Dispatch’s coverage, the state’s medical lobby provided a statement:

Tom Holloway, who lobbies for the Missouri State Medical Association, said the new law jeopardizes public safety because it allows midwives to "provide unlimited services related to pregnancy: C-sections, drugs, epidural anesthetic, even abortions, without any state regulation or oversight."

This clearly misses the point. The state’s oversight and regulations haven’t changed. Any expectant mother can still choose to use an “approved” nurse/doctor and receive the same care as always. But they don’t have too. And that is the point.

On June 23, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a devastating blow to our Constitution, ruling in a 5-4 decision that Americans only have a right to keep their homes, businesses, and houses of worship until their government decides a new owner would generate more tax revenue.  As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor pointed out in her dissent, the majority’s ruling in Kelo v. New London means that "[t]he specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory."

The public’s reaction to the Kelo decision was immediate and impassioned, making the case one of the most reviled Supreme Court opinions in recent history. Citizens throughout the nation demanded that their state governments act to make sure their property rights were secure. As a result, 42 states passed at least one bill in response to Kelo, although some bills (such as the eminent domain "reform" passed in Missouri) were far less effective than others.

Regrettably, the Supreme Court marked this anniversary by announcing today that it will not consider a case that might have given them the chance to scale back some of the damage done by Kelo. Suzette Kelo, on the other hand, is helping to spearhead the continuing effort to see property rights protected in this country, and she was present for the grand reopening of the little pink house that was at the center of the controversy. It has been relocated to another part of the city, where it will stand as a monument to the struggle that she and her neighbors shared with hundreds of thousands of their fellow citizens who are threatened with eminent domain. And, perhaps unsurprisingly, three years after New London won its case by persuading five justices that the displacement of these tax-paying property owners was necessary to complete the city’s revitalization, the "redevelopment site" remains a wasteland.

The Springfield News-Leader ran an op-ed about our recently published study of the "Missouri Plan" for judicial selection. The piece was written by the study’s authors, professors Joshua Hall and Russell Sobel. (Thanks again to Combest for the link on Saturday.)

The Show-Me Institute study of judicial selection is topical in Springfield for several reasons.  First — and this is really more of a statewide issue — there is another vacancy on the Missouri Supreme Court, so our system shall again be put into action and to the test. Also, some community leaders in Springfield are beginning a process to consider whether Greene County should join the five other local circuits in the state that use the non-partisan court plan at the local level. While the study itself focused on the Supreme Court, I believe its findings — that our current system of judicial selection is good for our economy — apply just as well to the local courts. And, clearly, from what television tells me, the legal community in Springfield could use some improvement. 

The Post-Dispatch rips a think tank in an editorial today, and — whew! — it ain’t us. The editorial (link via Combest) notes how a recent study by the National Center for State Courts had what the Post-Dispatch called a "fatal flaw" in its reasoning when it concluded the St. Louis City Circuit could make do with four fewer judges. The flaw was that more criminal cases go to trial in the city than elsewhere, trials take much longer than other caseload items (obviously), and the study did not realize this. Admittedly, this does seem like a substantial oversight by the think tank (that I will, again, repeat was not us).

Should the city lose some judges? Probably not now. But as tort reform kicks into high gear as the cases filed pre-reform get disposed of, and the city sees fewer overall cases, it might be a worthy idea in the near future.   

Dave reported that the Missouri Supreme Court recently ruled in favor of property owners regarding the misuse of eminent domain. In addition to setting a much needed precedent, this ruling will have important economic consequences. Specifically, it promotes a slightly more equitable and efficient compensation procedure that, in turn, creates new disincentives for some unnecessary designations of blight.

Clearly, this ruling defends blight victims’ rights to just compensation. The owners of blighted properties are now armed to potentially claim
damages caused over time by the negative designation on their homes and
businesses. We can easily sympathize with businesses and homeowners who suffer for years from decreased revenues and property values because of the uncertainties inherent in owning "blight." Hopefully, deserving home and business owners will follow the Gladstone
Plaza Shopping Center’s lead by keeping the thorough financial records necessary to sue for damages. Although the court’s decision will by no means deliver fully the promises of the Fifth Amendment, it is a step in the right direction for a select group of property owners.

I contend that a move toward compensation at market value will permit greater economic efficiency as well. Simply put, if a development will be more beneficial to society than the current inhabitants of a parcel of land, its investors should be able to buy out this inferior market competition. Half-baked arguments about positive externalities and the failure of markets to deliver public goods should not suffice to construct legal barriers for a class of private conflicts that can usually be resolved by supply and demand. Even if the unavoidable difficulty of providing for public goods can theoretically be used as a justification for eminent domain, Missouri authorities have surely crossed the line from beneficial to harmful.

For the most part, current legal hurdles exist solely to favor developers (socially beneficial and otherwise) by allowing them to force away competition for property at inefficiently low prices. If those prices become less hampered by interference, society will better allocate its scarce resources into the most efficient avenues (see the Coase Theorem). Nonetheless, there are certainly cases in which eminent domain can be used for greater social efficiency, regardless of its moral ramifications. Because of these exceptions, I cannot provide a wholesale endorsement of the due criticism leveled at eminent domain abuses based solely on economic efficiency grounds. Even so, marginal decreases in the use of eminent domain would undoubtedly benefit society economically. A move toward market forces, then, is not only ethically right but economically sound. In a limited capacity, the recent court ruling represents such a move.

Additionally, this decision will cause some developers to think twice before seeking government assistance in dealing with resistant property owners. Faced with the threat of lawsuits, those developers who don’t intend to proceed quickly with their projects will be less willing to stake claims on other people’s property. Unfortunately, this specific case in Gladstone offers little promise to owners of property that is condemned so quickly that its initial blight designation causes no quantifiable harm. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has offered a partial solution to one group of victims — individuals whose possessions hang in the uncertain limbo of pre-condemnation blight. This empowerment should at least deter future encroachments on property rights that won’t produce results within a somewhat reasonable time frame.

The recent court ruling is by no means a sufficient fix to Missouri’s struggle with eminent domain abuse. Because of its limited applicability, the decision will probably only benefit a handful of vigilant property owners. Nevertheless, those individuals will receive unprecedented relief that may establish a positive trend.

Yesterday the Missouri Supreme Court issued an opinion that offers a glimmer of hope for the thousands of property owners across the state whose properties have been labeled "blighted" by local authorities.  The unanimous decision held that property owners have a right, under both the state and federal constitutions, to recover damages resulting from blight designations placed on their homes and businesses, even if the authorities have not proceeded with the condemnation. The court did say that it would be difficult for the owners to prove that the damages were the result of the blight designation, because it will (incorrectly) presume that cities only place blight designations on areas that are already in decline, but held that where a property owner can demonstrate that economic losses have resulted from the city’s action, both constitutions demand that property owners be compensated.

This decision is a welcome development. As we have noted before, Missouri has become the worst state in the nation in terms of abusing eminent domain, and thousands of property owners have suffered immensely because one government agency or another determined that their home or business was in a "blighted" area. Previously, the Missouri Supreme Court had suggested that those affected had no hope of recovering their losses unless the General Assembly passed laws requiring cities to compensate those whose property values were damaged by a blight designation, so it is extremely heartening to see that, when directly faced with the question, the Court recognized the constitutional imperative that cities must put property owners "in as good a position" as if the blight designation had never happened.

I regard this case as a strong step in a positive direction for folks in this state, as well as a sign that the Missouri Supreme Court may be warming up to the protection of citizens’ property rights, despite their decision earlier this year in the Tourkakis case.

Tomorrow morning, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals will hear arguments in a rather unusual case. Jim Roos graduated from Concordia Seminary in 1970 and eventually founded Sanctuary in the Ordinary, a unique sort of ministry that provides ultra-low-income housing for those who would otherwise have nowhere to go, and tries to teach tenants some of the basics about living as part of a neighborhood. Roos renovated a number of properties in the McRee Town neighborhood, which later came to be targeted for redevelopment by the city of St. Louis. When it became clear that the city intended to use eminent domain to tear down the buildings that Roos’ ministry was trying to use for good, he painted a huge sign on one of them calling for an end to eminent domain abuse.

As it turns out, the city — and especially the Land Clearance Redevelopment Authority (LCRA) — didn’t much care for the criticism. The government cited Roos for illegally displaying a sign without a permit. Even though his right to free speech means that the city had no proper authority to require Roos to seek their permission to express his opinion about eminent domain, Roos complied with the city’s directive and applied for a permit. The LCRA persuaded the city’s Building and Inspection (B&I) Division to deny the permit, because Roos had not first gotten the LCRA’s permission to file the application. When Roos then sought the LCRA’s permission to pursue a sign permit, the LCRA denied his request. With the help of the Institute for Justice, Roos sued to enforce his constitutional rights to free speech.

When the city saw that the lawsuit sought to hold the LCRA accountable for its role in denying Roos’ constitutional freedoms, officials argued that the court should not hold the LCRA accountable because it had no authority to deny the permit in the first place. In other words, the city argued (and, remarkably, the trial court agreed!) that Roos was not entitled to a judgment that the LCRA had acted unlawfully because … well … the LCRA had acted unlawfully.

It is important for all of us that the Eighth Circuit reverses the lower court’s decision. If judges refuse to punish (or even recognize) constitutional violations resulting from improper assertions of governmental authority, agencies such as the LCRA will be able to continue intimidating people without fear of reprisal. These agencies already bully too many people just by using the powers already given them under the law — they surely should not be allowed to get away with making up new rules in order to exercise even more control over our lives.

There are several articles out in today’s media that touch on the courts, which is particularly appropriate given the late-night, alcohol-fueled discussion I had about tort reform with a certain close friend / trial lawyer at Blueberry Hill after darts this past Wednesday. So this post goes out to you, P.

First of all, Missourinet has an audio story about our recently released study of judicial selection (link via Mr. Combest). Check it out if you can. Next, the Washington Examiner has an article about tort reform success across America that mentions Missouri as an example. According to the article:

Since the reforms became law, the number of medical insurance companies in Texas increased from four to more than 30. Malpractice insurance premiums fell by as much as 31 percent.

This dovetails nicely with last month’s Missouri articles discussing insurance premium reductions for doctors, which we blogged about here at SMI.

I think the facts are pretty clear. Our judicial selection system is a good one for our state, although I believe small improvements can still be made to it (our study focused on the big picture and admitted minor changes could be either helpful or harmful). Even more importantly, the tort system had gotten out of whack before the "Missouri Plan" — particularly the venue laws — and changes needed to be made. Those changes have benefited our economy and our health care system. Now, unless some Law & Order twist happens in the next few seconds (like St. Luke’s Hospital announcing they are moving to St. Clair County, Ill.), I declare this post closed.

As David Stokes and I have previously discussed, I do, of course, agree that legislation should be the result of public debate and that legislators should have very clear ideas of what, precisely, for which they are voting. I would be thrilled if the legislature would discipline itself to avoid the silly game-playing that has taken the place of high-minded political debate. So our thoughts are perfectly in accord on that point.

This being the case, I believe our disagreement rests squarely on certain conflicting notions of the proper scope of political power and the value of individual liberty.

It seems to me that the gist of David’s recent post was that the "liberty" the Founders spoke of and wrote into the Constitution is not especially broad in scope. In his formulation, constitutional protections of "liberty" should be sufficient to require that property owners cannot be denied the opportunity to make simple modifications to their properties, like fencing or (presumably)
"reasonable" additions to a house, and the Constitution would prevent governments from curtailing one’s eccentric tastes in decoration. But if a citizen wants to use their property in a way that could arguably impose a
significant inconvenience on their neighbors, whether by increasing traffic,
noise, or offensive smells, Stokes’ argument suggests that part of the population would be entitled to utilize the power of government to forbid
the undesired use. In other words, "liberty," in its constitutional sense, is not really infringed when the government applies force against some of its citizens in order to protect other citizens from inconvenience or annoyance. Another way of stating this proposition is that some liberties don’t really merit protection and, therefore, exist solely at the tolerance of the majority. Even more succinctly, one person’s freedoms end where they create a critical mass of irritation among their neighbors.

While I am open to hearing a principled argument that would establish where the constitutional line of demarcation should be drawn on the spectrum of irritation between "Ugh, my neighbor’s yard is loaded with plastic pink flamingos" and "Whooo-eeee, my neighbor’s hog farm sure do kick up a stink," I do think that it would be difficult to make. If one concedes that some level of irritation (short of empirically demonstrable harm) is sufficient to justify legislative restriction of liberty, then the only question left is who gets to decide where the line will be drawn. As David pointed out, that will usually be the majority, and the majority can — and will — re-draw that line as it suits their interests, regardless of the cost to the liberty of those not in the mainstream.

I know Mr. Stokes too well to simply lump him in with the petty tyrants for whom I have such great distaste, but the position he took in his post does put him in some unsavory company. Those with conventional, mainstream sensibilities have always loved the idea that they might somehow force those around them to conform to their standards — all-too-frequently by drawing the aforementioned line of demarcation in a fashion very restrictive of liberty. This crew does not always utilize the power of government — after all, there are plenty of neighborhood associations working to police homeowners’ aesthetic standards — but zoning laws have long since become the favorite tool to dictate how citizens may be allowed to use what belongs to them. This is mostly because (as Mr. Stokes implied) the desired results are both easier to achieve and more certain when obtained by persuading local politicians to pass restrictive laws, rather than seeking remedy in the courts.

Those who pursue governmentally-enforced restrictions on property rights always argue (as, indeed, they must) that "[t]he fundamental rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
do not and ha[ve] never entailed the idea that anyone can form their own
city, state, or country if they don’t like the democratic decisions of
the majority of Americans." Mr. Stokes added, "I believe we actually fought a war about this issue." These are statements that deserve a thorough response.

Stokes is right insofar as we did fight a war about whether people have an inherent right to reject a government that denies their freedoms — it was called the American Revolution. When Jefferson wrote about the unalienable rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," he stated that "whenever any Form of Government becomes  destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it" (emphasis added). The Revolution was fought to secure our natural right to liberty, not so that the tyranny of the British Monarchy could be replaced by a tyranny of elected representatives.

It is vital to point out that a great many of the American colonies (Plymouth, Maryland, Rhode Island, etc.) and also several American states (Texas, West Virginia, Utah, among others) were founded precisely because a group of people was unwilling to live under the laws established by the majority to which they were formerly subject. The founding generation clearly would have approved of these acts, as it produced numerous works expressing concern that the people must be protected against what Alexis de Tocqueville called the "tyranny of the majority." James Madison, the "Father of the Constitution," thoroughly acknowledged this problem in Federalist 10, citing worries that "measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority." The American people demanded the creation of a Bill of Rights because they recognized the danger that even citizens of a democratic republic might one day produce laws that would violate individual freedoms, and they wisely intended to prevent future majorities from succeeding in that regard.

Even on a local level, the proper authority of government has not always been understood to allow majorities to dictate extensive limitations on liberty. Before the Missouri Supreme Court swayed from its original interpretation of the state Constitution, it did, in fact, hold that communities were and ought to be powerless to deny individuals the right to use their property as they saw fit, so long as the selected use did not threaten the health, safety, or welfare of the community. The court repeatedly stuck down local efforts to restrict citizens’ use of their property, arguing in State ex rel. Rosenblatt v. Sargent (1882) that a government that holds the property of its citizens subject to the unlimited control of "even the most democratic depository of power" would still be a despotism. That meant that cities were not permitted to limit the height, location, or use of buildings on their property unless the government demonstrated a threat to the neighborhood’s health or safety that would otherwise result. Only when the government had made such a demonstration — and, importantly, this did not include hypothetical or merely potential threats — would the courts permit cities to restrict their citizens’ liberties and property rights.

The final point I’ll make here has to do with David’s concern that applying the Constitution properly would require some to "go up against [some powerful business'] law firm to try to get some money from them." I’ll admit that it is terribly frustrating for people to have to go to litigation to seek redress of harms that they have suffered, but do we really want to sacrifice individual liberty for the sake of convenience? The American founders certainly didn’t think so, and neither did the Missouri Supreme Court until the late 1920s. Our legal system, while definitely imperfect, is a far better surety for freedom and justice than the capricious whims of those eager to force their neighbors to conform to their own ideas of what is proper and acceptable.

The Show-Me Institute has released our contribution to the ongoing debate about the "Missouri Plan" and judicial selection in Missouri. The study is called, "Is the ‘Missouri Plan’ Good For Missouri? The Economics Of Judicial Selection." Its authors, Prof. Joshua Hall and Prof. Russell Sobel, are terrific economists who measured how the various methods of judicial selection used in all 50 states rate when considered with the Institute for Legal Reform’s annual state rankings.

In short, it finds that Missouri’s current method of selecting Supreme Court justices (and appellate judges, and some lower court judges) is the most favorable system for the state’s economic growth, as measured by the ILR rankings. (To be clear, it’s actually tied with the closely related system of gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with legislative approval; Missouri does not have this last part.)

Now, how does this fit into the ongoing debate about reforming our system? It is very important to note that this study looks at the big picture, not the small parts. It places the 50 states into seven different categories based on their methods of judicial selection. However, the authors readily admit that there are minor differences between individual processes within each of those seven methods. The study concludes that the Missouri Plan is good for our state and for economic growth. It does not say that minor improvements or changes to the Plan are automatically bad things, although it does warn against going too far with minor changes. To that end, I think the study fits well with the Missouri Plan op-ed I wrote last year. (I should probably rephrase this, as the small op-ed fits with the major study — not the other way around.)

Nevertheless, I think this study provides an excellent framework for looking at this issue, and clearly warns against making significant changes to our plan. However, defenders of the current system (of which I am one) would be incorrect if they were to suggest that the study defends the current system exactly as it is.

The governor gave a series of speeches yesterday about the results of tort reform legislation that was passed in 2005. Combest has links to several articles about it. In my opinion, that legislation was the most important reform the state has made during the past 20 years, which luckily corresponds with my basic frame of reference.

Not surprisingly, the trial lawyers they quote in the article (actually, it’s the same one in each) don’t agree. And, even less surprisingly, the trial lawyers respond to facts and economics with a plea to the heart. From the article Southeast Missourian (all emphasis below is added):

Blunt said 2007 numbers were not available, but that from 2005 to 2006, average settlement costs fell nearly 14 percent, and total claims against Missouri doctors dropped by 61 percent.

Costs and claims falling is a good thing for our economy and health care system.  Let’s remember that, can we please? From the Columbia Daily-Tribune:

Dr. Jeff Thomasson, who spoke at the news conference, said that before the new law, his radiology group’s premiums rose 88 percent one year and 94 percent another year. Over the past two years, the premiums declined slightly, Thomasson said. As a result, he believes recruiting and retaining good doctors is easier.

That is extremely important. I specifically remember that during arguments I had about tort reform with trial lawyers (generally either my dad or my stepdad), they claimed doctors’ premiums would never actually go down because the entire reform was just a scam by the insurance companies, etc. (They probably said it much better than that, but that was the gist of it.) So, here we have specific evidence that tort reform legislation has lead to a decrease in insurance premiums, just as basic economics indicated it would.

From the MATA people, we get this:

Vuylsteke said the number of cases are declining because the elderly, the poor and parents of young children "can’t find lawyers to handle their cases because the lawyers can’t afford to represent them." For many lawyers, who must invest substantial costs in expert witnesses and in hours preparing for the trial, the risk simply isn’t worth it, he said.

If someone has a good case, they will find a lawyer to take that case. Guaranteed. What is being admitted to above, unintentionally, is that before tort reform many bad cases went forward because the system so favored the plaintiffs. Even in less-than-stellar cases, a St. Louis city venue alone was good enough to scare at least some type of settlement out of the defense. So now we have lower costs, lower premiums, and fewer meritless lawsuits moving forward. As I said, it’s been great for Missouri.

Bill McClellan has another excellent piece on the judicial selection system in Missouri. You may note that the changes proposed by the legislature that he is discussing sound a lot like some of the proposals I made in this op-ed last year. I’m not claiming credit or anything; I’m just sayin’ …

On Wednesday, the Missouri House passed a bill establishing a "Children’s Bill of Courtroom Rights." The bill outlines the rights of minors testifying in courtroom proceedings, including the right to a stuffed animal and a nap (I’m not making this up). Florida recently passed a bill allowing children to bring their pets to court as a "comfort item."

Don’t worry, I’m not going to throw a fit (or should we say tantrum?) about how this is an example of interest-group politics. I realize these are children, and it’s terrible that children should have to be witnesses in the first place. The courts should be as protective as possible for the children under their care.

But there are problems with the bill, and I’m not the only one who’s noticed them (in fact, the bill passed amid major opposition from Democrats and Republicans alike). Legislation like this, although well-intentioned, is dangerously broad.

It allows 17-year-olds tried as minors (with slick defense attorneys) to exploit child protection provisions. And it also sets a precedent for additional "courtroom rights" legislation, bogging down and undermining the judicial system.

In short, do we really need this legislation? Aren’t things like this better handled on a case-by-case basis? Are there really judges out there that would prevent 6-year-old children from holding teddy bears if they wanted to when testifying?

Even lawyers aren’t that heartless … :)

John Stoeffler has a column today in the South Side Journal, in which he quotes the famed constitutional scholar Joseph Story in support of his argument that each branch of government should be its own "final arbiter when it comes to deciding upon the constitutionality of the powers the Constitution authorizes and delegates to it."  If Congress or the president overstep their proper constitutional authority, Stoeffler says, the only legitimate remedy is to vote the bums out — the courts should have nothing to say on the matter. Stoeffler, who apparently operates a "constitutional think tank" called the Madison Forum, makes this notion of limited judicial authority the basis of his support for a proposed constitutional amendment before the General Assembly that would prohibit Missouri’s courts from ordering any increase of taxes or any expenditure of public funds unless they have been specifically authorized by the legislature or a vote of the people.

Stoeffler’s reasoning is flawed, even though the idea behind the constitutional amendment itself has some value. Federalist 78 explains that the judiciary is the proper branch of government to keep the other branches of government within their constitutional boundaries. Alexander Hamilton’s explanation of the judicial authority is directly contrary to that adopted by Story (and now, apparently, Mr. Stoeffler):

If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. [... T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.

Hamilton also opined on the limitations imposed on the judiciary itself. In contrast to the executive branch, which "holds the sword of the community," and the legislative branch, which "commands the purse" of the community, the judicial branch "has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend on the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments." (Emphasis in original.)

So, as described by the authoritative statement on the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, the proper role of courts is to rule upon the constitutionality of the acts of the other branches of government — but they are only empowered to strike down violations, not to refashion the laws so they will conform to the judiciary’s notions of what is proper. For example, school finance cases have been raging for years in Texas, but (despite the intense efforts of the school districts) the Texas Supreme Court recognizes that even when it has held the financing program unconstitutional, it is not permitted to compel the legislature to adopt a specific scheme. Instead, while the unconstitutional system may be enjoined, the legislature has full discretion as to how it will remedy the deficiency. And, of course, even the judiciary’s decisions are subject to checks and balances, in that the executive branch must agree to enforce the courts’ judgments.

There’s an interesting article in the Star today about the proposal for a shared, regionally built jail for the Kansas City area. I think this is a great idea and an opportunity for shared investment. Regional jails have worked very well in Saint Louis County and city. The county jail in St. Louis, which was initially paid for by the county via a bond issue but is used by all the municipalities, has worked out great. In St. Louis city, there are two jails. The new city jail is just for the city itself, although I think the feds pay to house some prisoners there on a temporary basis. But the lower-security city workhouse up on Hall Street houses low-risk prisoners who can’t pay their fines or restitutions from others counties, too, and that works out well for the city’s finances.

Jails are one of the few areas where I would generally be against privatization — although some services within jails should certainly be outsourced and privatized, such as the pharmacy. Consolidation is the key to efficient use of tax dollars for jails, and it’s great that the Kansas City area may be moving in that direction. Just as St. Louis County put its jail right next to its other government buildings, I think Kansas City should build a 20-story art deco jail right next to City Hall and the courthouse. Now, that would be sweet.

There is such a thing as too much milk, even if it does a blog good, so I’ll move on to another topic. The Post-Dispatch has an article about a city reviewing the results of its use of red-light cameras to improve safety make money. At the very least, we can credit the St. Peters Police Department for taking a hard look at the results of the cameras, and for trying to ensure the owner is also the driver. And while they point to a reduction in accidents at intersections, they admit they can’t credit it to the cameras — and also that they have no measure of the increased rear-end collisions at the same places. From the article (emphasis added in all excerpts):

But there was a piece of good news. The number of traffic crashes in St. Peters dropped 34 percent between 2005 and 2007 — though the report acknowledged that attributing the decline solely to red light cameras is problematic.

"While experiencing a reduction in crashes both citywide and at the target sites, the impact of red light photo enforcement on driver behavior may be difficult, if not impossible, to quantify," the report said.

Some studies have found that while red light cameras can help reduce side crashes, they can increase the number of rear-end accidents, as drivers slam on their brakes to keep from setting off the cameras.

Townsend said St. Peters has yet to determine whether the number of rear-end accidents has gone up.

In fact, the cameras do increase rear-end collisions — as several studies have shown. I don’t think anyone would deny that an increase in people covering their faces as they go through intersections is a bad thing. This can’t help but lead to an increase in accidents of just about any type, from front-end collisions to Dukes of Hazzard–style river jumping:

Police refer to them as "duckers" — drivers who try to shield their faces from red light cameras as they run signals at intersections watched 24/7 by electronic traffic enforcers.

The city of St. Louis maintains no such pretense of making sure the owner is the actual driver, nor do officials even pretend to care about anything other than raising revenue:

[T]he city of St. Louis is pulling in substantial revenue. Of nearly $2 million in total ticket revenue in the past year, the city has kept about $1.6 million, said Ron Smith, the city’s operations director.

Cameras in St. Louis don’t take pictures of drivers’ faces, so the city does not have the problem with duckers that St. Peters faces.

To be fair, if you go to court in the city and swear under penalty of perjury that you were not the driver, you can get the ticket dismissed. The best thing about people in local government is being able to watch your neighbors work to build a better community, and dedicate large amounts of time and effort to their city. The worst thing about some (not all, just some) of the people in local government is that they are all about the immediate and local issues, and have no knowledge of — or, more likely, just don’t care about — broader issues, like how red-light cameras and eminent domain abuse take away our liberty, piece by piece. (In the case of cameras, its the liberty to be presumed innocent that’s under assault, among other things.) So I hope we see an end to red-light cameras sometime soon.

The Federalist Society has released a study investigating the correlation between states with a merit selection judiciary (the so-called “Missouri plan” model) and school finance litigation.

The “Missouri Plan” amended the state Constitution such that judicial nominations are selected — at least in part — through an independent nominating counsel (generally comprising state American Bar Association-appointed lawyers) instead of by popular election. Today, 26 states have adopted some form of the “Missouri Plan” for their judicial appointments.

The legal benefits of the “Missouri Plan” are debatable. Many studies have examined the impact of such plans on business-friendly legislation (the argument being that judicial nominations appointed by ABA members will be less friendly to issues that might limit the market for lawyers). In fact, in an upcoming policy report, the Show-Me Institute will examine the Missouri Plan in detail. (Stay tuned for the excitement!)

The Federalist Society’s research highlights at least one negative aspect, however. To date, 45 states have addressed education adequacy litigation. According to data gathered by Columbia University, about two-thirds of adequacy decisions in Missouri Plan states strike down the legislatures’ funding statutes. This means that courts have effectively commandeered the power of the purse — something clearly within the proper domain of the legislatures.

In addition, in a joint study by the Institute for Justice and the American Legislative Exchange Council, analysts found that school voucher systems are constitutional in 77 percent of states with popularly elected judiciaries, versus 50 percent in Missouri Plan states.

So I guess this was a long way of me saying that there is evidence that courts are friendlier to the school choice movement in states where judges are elected by the people themselves.

More accurately, the title of this entry should read, "Stokes Posts Blog Post About Bail Bondsmen," but titles should be quick and to the point, so I’m told. There is an article today in the Columbia Daily Tribune (link via John Combest) about a controversial bail posting in Boone County, which follows up on a New York Times article about the entire bail-bond industry last week. Taken together, they provide a very interesting look at a unique industry — one that, to its eternal credit, has lent itself to many fine movies.

The controversy in the Boone County case involved several issues: The bonding agent lacked a license to work in Boone County (not a big deal, in my opinion); the bonding company itself did not have the assets to guarantee such a large bond (a very big deal, obviously); and the unusual structure through which the family of the accused agreed to pay the bonding company (I have no idea whether this is a big deal). To sum it up quickly, the court rejected the bond after the accused was released, and he was taken back into custody at a higher bond. Because the suspect is accused of a heinous crime — murder — I have no problem with the higher bond requirement.

The Times article focuses on the big scheme of things in the bonding world, and contains a number of quotes that could have been written by somebody at a free-market think tank. Here are a couple:

The system costs taxpayers nothing, [Professional Bail Agents of the United States spokesman Bill] Kreins said, and it is exceptionally effective at ensuring that defendants appear for court. [...]

“Here’s what everybody forgets,” [bail bondsman Wayne Spath] said. “The taxpayers have to pay for these programs. Why should they pay for them? Why should they? When we can provide the same service for free.”

Sounds good to me. But this is the key question: Does the system work? From the article (emphasis added, for all quotations throughout this post):

According to the Justice Department and academic studies, the clients of commercial bail bond agencies are more likely to appear for court in the first place and more likely to be captured if they flee than those released under other forms of supervision.

Why does the system work?

That may be because bail bond companies have financial incentives and choose their clients carefully.

Wait a minute … are they saying that incentives work? There are, of course, critics of the industry:

“The bail bond system is rife with corruption,” said Joshua Marquis, the district attorney in Clatsop County, Ore. Since bond companies do not compete on price, they have every incentive to collude with lawyers, the police, jail
officials and even judges to make sure that bail is high and that
attractive clients are funneled to them.

Mr. Kreins, the industry spokesman, acknowledged scandals in Illinois, where “basically all the agents were in collusion with the judges,” and in Louisiana, where sheriffs were also in the mix.

The first part is a legitimate critique, if it’s true. While the amount of bail set should not be a matter of debate or competition, the fee percent charged by various bail bondsmen can certainly fluctuate, unless governments regulate that fee as part of the licensing requirements? If that is the reason agents don’t compete on price, it’s the regulation that should be gotten rid of — not the industry. As for the second critique of corruption in Illinois and Louisiana, those two states have corruption even in the kindergarten industry, along with everything else. Corruption in those two states (plus Rhode Island) is a problem with the entire system, not just one industry.

Since the critique comes from Oregon, what does the article say has happened since Oregon banned the bail bond industry?

Mr. Marquis, the Oregon prosecutor, said doing away with commercial bonds had affected the justice system in a negative way as well. “The fact of the matter is,” he said, “that in states like Oregon the failure-to-appear rate has skyrocketed.”

What does the rest of the world do (except for the Philippines, which uses our system, certainly a leftover from colonialism)? Please trust that the inserted sarcastic comments in brackets below are mine, and were not in the original article:

Some simply keep defendants in jail until trial [oh, that's a much better solution for someone who is poor and genuinely innocent]. Others ask defendants to promise to turn up for trial ['cause a criminal would'nt lie]. Some make failure to appear a separate crime [I am sure someone facing 20 years is very worried about the addition of a failure-to-appear charge]. Some impose strict conditions on release, like reporting to the police frequently [I can't see any possible way around that, like stopping at the police station while on your way to the bus station]. Some make defendants liable for a given sum should they fail to appear but do not collect it up front [see above comment on separate crime]. Others require a deposit in cash from the defendant, family members or friends, which is returned when the defendant appears. [Because taking money from a poor family is preferable to taking it from a for-profit business? What the hell?]

There are very good, historical reasons why our system evolved as it did. The Times article is outstanding, and it goes through those reasons. But it only hints at the fact that our bail system — like our overall criminal system — is much more favorable than the systems in the rest of the world toward people accused, but not yet convicted, of a crime. The rights to counsel, the presumption of innocence, the bail system itself, and many more aspects are all indicative of a system that favors the rights of the people, until those rights are abrogated by a conviction in court — not the other way around.

Plus, Charles Grodin was lying when he said he wasn’t able to fly. That part was funny.

Yesterday, oral arguments were heard in a lawsuit in Jefferson City about a language change in a 2008 Missouri ballot initiative. The initiative will address state-based affirmative action programs, and will appear on the November 2008 ballot.

The Missouri Civil Rights Initiative (MCRI), the plaintiff in the case and defender of the initiative’s original language, argues that the new language is politically biased and misleading.

The article quotes the original ballot language submitted by MCRI as follows:

"Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to prohibit any form of discrimination as an act of the state by declaring, ‘The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education or public contracting?’"

The Missouri Secretary of State’s office, however, changed the language to read:

"Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to:

1. ban affirmative action programs designed to eliminate discrimination against, and improve opportunities for, women and minorities in public contracting, employment and education; and

2. allow preferential treatment based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin to meet federal program funds eligibility standards as well as preferential treatment for bona fide qualifications based on sex?"

I think you could argue that both wordings are somewhat misleading. But I sympathize with the MCRI’s argument. The original language is clear: the Missouri Constitution should be amended "to prohibit any form of discrimination as an act of the state." That would include ending any existing affirmative action or race-based preferential treatment.

The new language says the same thing, but in a much more emotively-charged way. By explicitly including buzz words such as "affirmative action," the initiative immediately polarizes voters. I think that the MCRI’s argument that this language will unfairly sway the election is valid. Moreover, it appears that the Secretary of State’s office took tremendous liberty with the submitted language from the MCRI.

Preferential treatment, whether positively intended or not, is problematic and invites all kinds of race-based politics. A truly "color-blind" society should value its citizens based on their merit, not on the color of their skin, their place of birth, or their sex. I think that the MSCI strives to achieve such a society.

You can’t really give away something that doesn’t belong to you — especially if the "recipient" is its rightful owner! While it may seem like common sense for most people, Attorney General Jay Nixon apparently has trouble grasping this simple idea. Instead, he continues to insist that the Department of Natural Resources is nefariously giving Union Pacific Railroad a sweetheart deal just by allowing the company to do what it wants with its own property.

The bridge at the heart of the lawsuit belongs to Union Pacific Railroad, which purchased it from the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad in 2004. The dispute has come about because in 1987 MKT reached an agreement with the state that gave the DNR nearly 200 miles of right-of-way for use by the Katy Trail project. That agreement specifically excluded the Booneville lift bridge, although the state was given assurances that the railroad would not modify the bridge in such a way that the Katy Trail would be disrupted.

Since that agreement was reached, the DNR has decided not to use the bridge for trail purposes, and the bridge is currently not being used by anyone at all. To make absolutely certain that the DNR’s intentions were clear, and to guarantee that the railroad had no further duty to maintain the bridge for trail purposes, the DNR officially released and permanently waived any rights it might have had to use the bridge.

The attorney general’s misguided lawsuit, which has already cost taxpayers hundreds of thousands of dollars, basically claims that the DNR has no authority to say that it isn’t interested in using the bridge. Nixon wants to force the DNR — against its avowed desires — to claim a right to keep using the bridge even though it does not fit into their plans for the Katy Trail.

Even though two courts have now thoroughly rejected Nixon’s arguments about the bridge’s ownership, he is vowing to press on — at taxpayer expense — to the Missouri Supreme Court.

The bottom line is that Union Pacific, the rightful owner of the bridge, now wants to make use of its raw materials for another bridge and Nixon should be ashamed for using taxpayer dollars in his personal quest to prevent them from doing so.

The school districts acting as the plaintiffs in CEE v. Missouri, which have thus far used more than $3 million of taxpayers’ money to purchase themselves a thorough, well-reasoned judicial beating, have announced their intention to use several million more of your dollars to see if they can persuade the Missouri Supreme Court to take leave of its senses and force taxpayers to give school districts an additional $1.3 billion.

As I have previously mentioned, the insanity of this case is that these districts are spending your money in a misguided effort to get at even more of your money. With this post, however, let’s look at just how deep this money pit could get:

This summer’s trial required public spending in excess of $4 million, accounting both for the districts’ spending and the expense of the state’s legal defense. The plaintiffs’ Supreme Court appeal will cost at least several million more. But that won’t be the end of it! Even if the districts prevail at the Supreme Court, the taxpayers’ financial bleeding will continue because the case will almost certainly be kicked back to the trial court to determine how much taxpayers must add to the 36 percent of state revenues already going to education. That probably means at least one more trial — and, in all likelihood, another trip to the Missouri Supreme Court. The eventual total for legal expenses in this case could easily run to $25 million, and that doesn’t even consider the financial burden taxpayers would face if the districts win.

History also shows that even if the suing school districts are successful, the issue will remain embroiled in costly litigation for years as the districts continue to push for more funding. Courts in other states have been forced to confront round after round of these legal battles. A study discussed at our recent school finance conference points out that the billions of dollars in court-ordered educational spending has resulted in zero improvement in the educational outcomes for students in those states.

So I hope that Missouri citizens will enjoy the progress of this case for its entertainment value, if nothing else. After all, we’re the ones paying for it.

The Arch City Chronicle links to two stories, one from Detroit and one from DC, on issues of interest to Missouri and the Show-Me Institute. The first one, from Detroit, regards the city’s plans to sell 92 of its parks, just as the city of St. Louis recently sold (or leased, whatever it was) a small area of Forest Park to Barnes Hospital, over much protest. The Detroit Free-Press article in very interesting, particularly in that parks abutting schools might just be transferred to the school district. I also think it would be a good idea for neighborhood associations to have the first crack at buying the parks, at a discounted rate, provided they commit to maintaining them.

The other article is from the Washington Post on judicial elections. While changes may indeed be necessary for our own Missouri Plan, this article clearly shows the problems that come from large-scale judicial elections. I hope we make needed improvements to our judicial selection system, but I in no way want to move toward the elections we see over in Illinois that are described in this article.

On October 17, Judge Richard G. Callahan rendered a decision in the case brought by many of Missouri’s school districts alleging that the State of Missouri does not adequately fund public education. Judge Callahan concluded that the state is meeting its constitutional obligation to spend 25 percent of the state budget on K-12 public education.

Legal proceedings are not cheap. According to an Associated Press article written by David Lieb, two organizing bodies of Missouri’s school districts — The Committee for Educational Equality and the Coalition to Fund Excellent Schools — have spent $1.9 million and $700,000 respectively. In addition, the St. Louis School District spent $600,000. Overall, plaintiffs have spent $3.2 million in trying this case.

At the time the case started, the school districts would have thought of this as an investment. In this context, the return is abysmal. After spending $3.2 million, the additional funding — after enforcing Judge Callahan’s ruling — will be zero. So, from the school district’s perspective, the return is negative-100 percent, so far. Perhaps it is too early to measure the returns. Often, it takes time to realize the gains from such an investment. I cannot accurately forecast how this trial will affect Missouri’s legislature. Hence, it is possible that the school districts will realize significant gains in the future.

What is the likelihood that Missouri’s General Assembly will feel compelled to increase their contribution to K-12 education? In my view, the answer is that they will not. For the sake of disclosure, I should mention that I computed the Legislature’s obligation for this trial, presenting evidence that the state was more-than-meeting its constitutional minimum. Indeed, my independent calculations indicated that the state spent more than 35 percent of its discretionary budget on K-12 education in each of the last three years. Based on my calculations, it is difficult to imagine that the Legislature will feel compelled to increase its contribution to elementary and secondary education, given that it is spending more than one-third of its discretionary budget on this activity. By this reasoning, the most likely event is that K-12 education will receive the same funding, as a percentage of the state’s general revenue, as it did last year.

Thus, unless Missourians want to specify an even larger fraction of state resources to funding elementary and secondary education, the return to this trial investment will not improve much from this year’s utter failure during the next few years. In economics, the question starts with the opportunity cost of the resources spent on this trial. Even if the per-district expenditures are a small fraction, the relevant question is whether the school districts would have had a higher return by spending those resources on producing education. It is hard to imagine that the return would be negative-100 percent if spent on books, teachers, science equipment, etc. Elementary economics tells us that resources should flow to their highest valued use. It is time for school districts to apply this logic.

The Missouri Ethics Committee announced today that it will delay a decision on how to enforce July’s Supreme Court ruling that struck down a law repealing Missouri’s campaign contribution limits (see the article in the Kansas City Star).

Apparently, candidates from across the state and the political spectrum collected well over their contribution limits during the first six months of 2007, and now the committee is unsure of how to address (read: “rectify”) the situation.

Now, I don’t have a legal education — my background in constitutional law stems from a single undergraduate course five years ago. But I realize the court has held that campaign finance restrictions do not violate free speech because, apparently, “money is not speech.”

You may or may not agree, but I think the current argument that candidates should have to return their excess contributions, as a matter of equal treatment to the other candidates, is ridiculous.

The candidates did have equal treatment under the law during the time those limits were lifted. Some were preferred over others — which is why they collected more money. In economics, money is a tool used for determining revealed preferences, which essentially means that we can find out what consumers really want by tracking their purchasing habits. Consumer preference for a candidate is revealed by the candidate’s ability to collect campaign contributions. I personally think that spending money is a form of speech, and that I should be allowed to spend as much of my money as I want to provide either myself or someone else with a platform to share their views. Moreover, I think this is efficient.

But I guess that’s only because I believe in this silly idea called freedom.

The Wall Street Journal has a lead editorial today on Missouri’s system of selecting judges, very originally known as "The Missouri Plan." Unfortunately, as most of you know, the Journal’s damned website is subscription only, so I can’t link to the entire thing for you. I had the bright idea of cutting the article out of our dead tree edition, scanning it, and linking to the file (a clever idea only about a billion people have already thought of), but stopped when I was informed that might be illegal. Anyway, the editorial is interesting but ultimately disappointing. The final summation:

Keeping judicial selection democratically accountable is the best insurance for choosing the best judges, and ensuring that they are serving the interests of the citizens.

I can’t tell whether that is calling for all judges to be elected, or just for increased transparency and more involvement by elected officials in the selection process. My guess is that they are calling for all judges to be elected, which would be an absolutely terrible idea statewide and in larger counties. If they are merely calling for more openness and input from elected officials, I agree with that, to a large extent.  As a reminder, my own op-ed on this issue is here. There are many good parts of the editorial, too, especially the none-too-kind comments on the current Supreme Court panel Governor Blunt gets to pick from.

The ending of the Wall Street Journal editorial isn’t its only weakness, though. It quotes a poll, as if that is some sort of evidence for anything:

In a Federalist Society poll done in March, 87% of state residents were unaware even of the make-up of the nominating commission.

An any point in time, about 30 percent of Americans can’t name the vice president. Should we get rid of that office? Any idea how many people can, right now, name their state representative? I am guessing 20 percent at most. Should we get rid of them? (Don’t answer that.)  I am actually surprised 13 percent of Missourians could correctly list the commission’s make-up. Just because people watch "Entertainment Tonight" instead of reading The Economist does not mean the Missouri Plan is flawed.

I was going to post today on additional feedback my op-ed has received, but the Journal seemed more topical. I’ll do that tomorrow. Can’t you just feel the excitement? 

P.S. — You wanted more Spike Lee references, you got ‘em!

Our newest policy analyst, David Stokes, spent years involved with local and county government, and other area organizations, before joining us. He recently applied the breadth of his experience and insight to the judicial selection process, in an op-ed we posted to our site yesterday (also picked up by the Missouri Political News Service).

Anybody paying attention to Missouri news recently will know about the recent controversy over judicial selection, with each side claiming that the other wants the process politicized in its favor. Some have called the legitimacy of the Missouri Plan into question, but David thinks the system has a great deal of value that a few important tweaks would enhance:

Missourians amended our state constitution in 1940 to change the ways judges were selected for the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the circuit courts of Jackson County and Saint Louis City. This was done in response to public concerns about the power of political machines in electing judges under the previous system. Dubbed “The Missouri Plan,” it has been expanded to include circuit judges in Saint Louis, Clay, and Platte Counties. The amendment’s provisions replaced elections with a judicial commission, which reviews applicants for open positions and narrows the list down to three choices. The governor then selects a new judge from that panel. The system has worked very well for Missourians, taking some of the politics out of judgeships and efficiently filling vacancies. However, a few important changes could make the plan work even better.

Read more about David’s proposed changes on the Show-Me Institute website.