Tax Credits Are an Undesirable Strategy for Missouri
There was some classic rent-seeking behavior in the editorial section of the Post-Dispatch yesterday: An architect touts historic preservation tax credits. (Thanks to John Combest for the link.) According to his tagline, the author “has worked on many renovation projects on Washington Avenue,” a location that has received many of these tax credits. We witness this type of behavior all too frequently in Missouri — in the film industry, in the local agriculture industry, in the dental industry, etc. Although the actors may change, the plot remains the same: One group asks the government to adopt policies (e.g., tax credits, occupational licenses) that would benefit that group only, and at the expense of all other groups.
I want to take this opportunity to present arguments against the claims that the author made, and also to explain how tax credits are undesirable policy for Missouri. The author of the editorial states:
The tax-credit program may need fine tuning, but it is too important for St. Louis and Missouri to scale back — especially in difficult economic times.
The state can least afford giving tax credits to select firms and businesses during difficult economic times. Tax credit programs place an additional burden on taxpayers who are already hurting in difficult economic times. I don’t know whether the author has heard, but Missouri is out of money! Many other programs compete for these funds, so the government and taxpayers face an opportunity cost equal to the amount of the tax credit. Additionally, because unredeemed tax credits represent a future liability, they will negatively affect a state’s ability to recover from difficult economic times when it has to dole out money at unexpected intervals in the future.
Tax credits are used as a powerful tool for economic development all across the state, not only creating a considerable number of jobs but also providing many social benefits.
According to a study of tax credit cost controls recently released by Missouri State Auditor Susan Montee, tax credits have less of an impact than predicted and cost more than anticipated. The report reviewed 15 major tax credit programs in Missouri, and found that the fiscal notes underestimated the total cost of the programs by $1.1 billion over a five-year period. For the historic preservation tax credit — the one for which the author specifically lobbies — the redemptions far exceed the estimated fiscal impact. From the audit report (emphasis mine):
[T]he fiscal notes accompanying Senate Bill 1 of the 1997 2nd Extraordinary Session, that established the historic preservation tax credit, estimated an annual fiscal impact of $14.3 million. The only other legislation impacting this credit through the 2008 legislative session was Senate Bill 827 in 1998 and the fiscal note for that bill indicated the impact of the statutory change was unknown. Based upon our methodology, the projected fiscal impact was $14.3 million annually and $71.5 million over the 5 year period, while redemptions totaled over $637 million.
This trend is not specific to tax credits for historic preservation; many other tax credit programs also fail to live up to their hype. For example, Missouri subsidizes the film industry with tax credits, but there have been fewer people employed in the industry since the tax credit program began.
Furthermore, targeted tax credits discourage economic development in the state by hurting businesses in non-favored industries. By providing special advantages to a select industry, targeted tax credits force everyone else in the market to compete at a disadvantage. An uneven playing field is not an optimal economic climate for fostering development.
A particular program may provide some social benefits, but the state has to weigh this against the marginal cost of devoting money to a particular project. The state needs to consider those competing needs carefully, because resources are scarce.
Quoting again from the Post-Dispatch editorial:
The ability of tax credits to create jobs and generate economic activity has been recognized by some of our neighboring states. Kansas has removed its cap on tax credits, and Nebraska increased its cap by $30 million.
If all of the other states jump off a bridge, should Missouri jump, too?
The great thing about the state system is that they function as living laboratories. Policymakers can observe the effects of policies in other states, determine whether they are successful, and decide whether these policies should be incorporated into their own states. Observing the effects of tax credit programs reveals that they do not result in their stated purposes, and spending more on them is unlikely to result in better outcomes.
Tangentially, a big downside to the editorial is the author’s lack of focus; he talks about tax credits for historic preservation in places, then talks about general tax credit programs in others. In the above quotation, the author seems to speak of tax credits in general, although this is unclear. In reality, Missouri issues more tax credits for historic buildings than any other state in the nation. Virginia issues the second most, but spends only half as much on them as Missouri.
But many of these developments would not be feasible without tax credits. [...] The Washington Avenue loft district would not have happened without the tax credit program. [...] The renovation of the Chase Park Plaza complex would never have taken place without the historic preservation tax credits. Tens of millions of dollars were invested in the project. [...] Without the credits, significant private investment [in the Forest Park Southeast neighborhood] would not have been made.
Here, the author fails to consider the direct and indirect consequences that may have come into existence had the taxpayers of Missouri been allowed to keep their millions. The Chase Park Plaza and a renovated historical building are easily seen effects; however, the products and services that would have otherwise been consumed in the private sector represent the unseen effects. The tens of millions of dollars that were invested in the Chase Park Plaza were taken away from taxpayers who would otherwise have spent it on the products and services that they needed and wanted most. As Henry Hazlitt explains in Economics in One Lesson, for every public job created by the Chase Park Plaza (or historic preservation on Washington Avenue), a job has been destroyed in the private sector. Development is easy to see, but the unseen includes the jobs that were destroyed because the money that would have funded them was appropriated for other uses.
At a news conference, Gov. Nixon acknowledged that the state tax credit program is used “for good and solid purposes.” Last year, he was even promoting the expansion of tax credits for businesses, claiming it was essential for Missouri’s economy.
Yes, but the governor has also called for tax credit cuts. As an illustration of his support for cutting tax credits, the Associated Pressed dubbed him “cutter-in-chief.” In this regard, the governor sends a mixed message.
[T]hey are not giveaways.
Tax credits operate by reducing the recipient’s individual or corporate income tax bills. By reducing the tax burden of a single targeted industry or company, if overall government spending is not also reduced by the amount of that credit, the marginal tax rate for everybody else increases. This shifting of the tax burden from one party to others is certainly a type of giveaway. In addition, the fact that many of these tax credits are transferable means that they can be sold on a secondary market. Consequently, tax credits can ultimately benefit individuals who have nothing to do with the rationale for their issuance.
Much has been made of the tax credits costing the state $585 million last year — up 57 percent since 2001. This only indicates the program is working well.
If the Missouri Department of Economic Development were successful in developing the economy, it would eliminate the need for its own existence. That obviously hasn’t happened. However, if by “working well” the author means creating a system of corporate welfare, then I agree.
But lost revenue can be made up many times more by economic activity not otherwise generated. This means additional tax dollars for schools and essential services.
Tax credit programs are growing at a much faster rate than the state’s revenues, as communicated in the Missouri state auditor’s report on tax credits. This is not a sustainable trend, because continuing at this rate would eventually lead to the state issuing more money in tax credits than it takes in as revenue. From fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2009 in the state of Missouri, tax credit redemptions increased by 57 percent, while net general revenue fund collections increased by only 15.7 percent.
Additionally, many of these tax credits include property tax abatements, which means that the local and state government will receive no tax revenue from the new business. The new IBM service center in Columbia is a recent example.





The article says “[o]bserving the effects of tax credit programs reveals that they do not result in their stated purposes.” Have you seen downtown St. Louis or Kansas City before and after the historic credit passed? The evidence is to CLEARLY the contrary. This credit program works.
And right now, it is about all that is working. The article states that “for every public job [created by a tax credit project]…a job has been destroyed in the private sector.” False. These are private jobs! And frankly, these are about the only private construction jobs in the entire private real estate sector. Were it not for these tax credits, the painters, drywallers, etc. would probably be sitting at home collecting unemployment.
Lastly, the article discounts the fact that other states are choosing to enhance state tax credit programs by simply asking “If all of the other states jump off a bridge, should Missouri jump, too?” What an interesting argument coming from the same policy group that constantly compares MO to states without an income tax and says we should eliminate our income tax. Guess you favor jumping?
There are many benefits to historic and other state tax credits that are intentionally ignored by this article. Here’s one: Hundreds of millions in Missouri development happen each year as a result of state tax credits, but Missouri doesn’t shell out any tax credits until well after the construction workers have collected their checks, gone home and paid income taxes. How many other investments give you a return before you spend a dime?
Comment by Chris — June 18, 2010 @ 5:08 p.m.
Chris,
You conveniently ignore how “transferability” of the historic preservation tax credit actually allows their conversion into developer equity well before construction commences.
Furthermore, you are going to have to do a lot more to convince me that you aren’t conflating correlation with causation in regard to how the “credit program works” in downtown St. Louis.
In the absence of the credit program, “painters, drywallers, etc.” would likely seek work from those who deploy capital through private streams instead of through the public trough.
Do you suggest that the historic preservation tax credit exists solely to promote construction? Why is construction more deserving of promotion than food production? Art? Music? Accounting? Biology?
Should the state support every industry, or should the state limit the breadth of its economic influence?
I have my answer.
Do you find it at all curious that “developers” may combine the Missouri Historic Preservation Tax Credit with the Federal Historic Preservation Tax Credit to receive up to a total of 45% of certified project costs for income-producing properties?
Should taxpayers pay for each project twice–at both the federal and state levels?
I would enjoy hearing your response. I always say the more substantive debate about tax credits, the better!
Comment by Thomas Duda — June 20, 2010 @ 11:13 p.m.
The conversion into equity during (not well before) construction comes from private dollars, not state. The state benefits from not paying until the historic building is actually preserved.
One on hand, you say this incentive doesn’t cause development, on the other hand you imply it is too rich. Choose one or the other. It either doesn’t work well enough or it is working too well.
There is nothing wrong with developers developing using economic incentives. If you are a developer and have a choice between building a strip center on a green field in the suburbs or renovating an environtmental and structural trainwreck in the dense urban core, and there are no incentives for preservation, your choice is obvious. With incentives, you actually may prefer to take the choice the state policy favors.
By the way, are you the Tom Duda of RGSZ? Suprised if so.
Comment by Chris — June 21, 2010 @ 7:59 a.m.
Thanks for the comment back, Chris.
I hope this can be the first of as many dialogues as you would like.
No, these days I’m just Thomas Duda of SMI. I graduated in 2008 from Carleton College and attended graduate school in urban planning at Cornell University, before withdrawing prior to the completion of my master’s degree. I am a lifelong St. Louisan, former employee of the Landmarks Association, former employee of the American Institute of Architects and definite critic of tax credits as a mechanism for public finance.
From a public budgetary standpoint, a dollar issued in tax credits is equivalent to a direct fiscal outlay by the state. Could you help me to understand precisely why a tax credit is the preferred funding mechanism as opposed to a direct expenditure? Transferability often results in a loss to the state as best that I can discern. If the state spends $1, but the credit is transferred for $0.91, then $0.09 of our money is not supporting direct preservation activities.
I recognize that preservation may be costly; however, I think it imperative that we recognize that our conception of what constitutes an historical rehabilitation is a socio-political construction. In other states, easing code regulation of historic properties undergoing rehabilitation arguably resulted in additional preservation activity.
There are a multitude of policy approaches that our state can take to ensure the continued productive use of historic property.
I think that we need to consider the structure of the Missouri Historic Preservation Tax Credit to determine whether it A.) does what many say it does and B.) whether there are alternative approaches and/or changes in public policy that could result in additional preservation activities at a lower cost to the public.
I think that reform of Missouri’s HP Credit could be the impetus for the development of even better policies that will yield even more preservation activity in our state.
As for your remark “It either doesn’t work well enough or it is working too well,” I simply respond by saying that there is no substantive quantitative evidence to show that 25% is the level at which the subsidy encourages additional desired rehabilitation work that would otherwise not occur. How are these incentives priced?
I would support lowering barriers for accessing the credit, namely by eliminating the “substantial rehabilitation” requirement. I think that more projects would occur at lower costs to the state if the 50% expenditure threshold were lowered.
But then again, these are nothing more than my garbled musings on the subject.
I think that we would both be kidding ourselves if we believed that there weren’t alternative means of accomplishing a desired public policy end–historic preservation.
Comment by Thomas Duda — June 21, 2010 @ 11:36 a.m.