Personal Responsibility Is the Best Medicine
Bill Maher and I can agree on something: Americans are fat and lazy.
Yesterday on the Huffington Post, Maher posted an editorial, “New Rule: You Can’t Complain About Health Care Reform If You’re Not Willing to Reform Your Own Health.”
President Obama has identified all the problems with the health care system, but there’s one tiny issue he refuses to tackle, and that’s our actual health.
The best thing that a person can do to improve for his or her health is to abandon unhealthy habits. These are lifestyle changes that are simple and inexpensive. If a person quits smoking, he or she will even save money.
This week, the British Medical Journal published a study showing that men who stopped smoking and switched to a low-fat diet elongated their lives by an average of 10 years. The researchers followed 19,000 men, starting in the late 1960s. PLOS-Medicine published a similar study in 2008 that demonstrated a 14-year increase in longevity, not just 10, with four items only: non-smoking, daily exercise, eating vegetables and fruits, and weight control.
There is a farrago of other lifestyle changes that can positively affect a person’s longevity, such as flossing and moving to a rural area.
If Americans do not stop shirking personal responsibility for their own health, any effort at health care reform will be inefficacious.
But I suppose that it’s easier to blame fast food restaurants or the government.
I think you are exactly correct when you say that “The best thing that a person can do to improve for his or her health is to abandon unhealthy habits.” This is not only true for individuals’ health, but also for keeping health care costs down. But what do you do when you grant people freedom and they make the wrong choices? It’s very easy to say: man, if people just took more personal responsibility, the world would be a better place (Who doesn’t agree with that?). Unfortunately, in the current state of affairs, people are not only fat and lazy, but irresponsible and irrational as well.
The problem, as I see it, with people not taking personal responsibility is that we haven’t given them a large enough incentive to be responsible (especially with regard to their personal health). Maher argues that we should tax things that result in negative health outcomes such as cigarettes, alcohol, and fatty foods. Do you agree, or do you think that would inhibit liberty and distort incentives?
Comment by Andrew Hanson — September 19, 2009 @ 3:51 p.m.
I don’t know about distorted incentives, Andrew. With the amount of money we spend subsidizing high fructose corn syrup, our incentives are distorted plenty already. Miss Harbin may simply reply that she wants all distortions removed and that in a Free Market, we will have our cake and not eat it too, because we will have found out that cake is too expensive.
My biggest objection to the ‘personal responsibility’ argument is that it ignores the reality of human fallibility. Now I could get on a long rant here quoting everyone from Martin Luther (’we are all beggars’) to St. Paul (’what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate- this I keep on doing!’), but I’ll spare you a longer rant as I know that you prefer the heights of Babel to the heights of Calvary.
But suffice it to say that people are weak, and ignoring that weakness leads to bad social policy. Nicotine in cigarettes is addictive! It gets in your brain and makes you feel good and wanting more. Foods high in fats and sugars taste great to us- our bodies release chemicals saying we want more of them. We ain’t nothing but mammals.
Comment by David C. Miller — September 19, 2009 @ 7:50 p.m.
Thank you for your comments, Andrew and David. You both communicated arguments that I hadn’t previously considered.
I do not believe that it’s the role of government to protect people from their own bad decisions. I believe that a person does not actually have free choice unless she has the freedom to make bad decisions.
I suppose that I hadn’t considered that individuals are fallible and tend to make bad choices. I prefer to think the best of people. In the process of writing this reply, I tried (unsuccessfully) to find a politically correct way to say that I don’t care what other individuals do, I just don’t to be held responsible for the medical bills that result from their bad decisions. If an individual decides to smoke her entire life, that’s her prerogative. I think she should be free to make the decision to do that. I just don’t want my tax dollars to pay for her eventual coronary angioplasty. I feel the same way about the individual who chooses to eat fatty food at every meal. I don’t want to be billed for his gastric bypass surgery in the future.
Comment by Christine Harbin — September 20, 2009 @ 12:01 p.m.
Yep, I understand the libertarian argument that we shouldn’t protect people from themselves, but I think it’s a specious one. If paternalism results in better outcomes, there isn’t really any good reason to reject it in the name of “freedom” or “liberty”. However, I do think that paternalism often does not result in better outcomes and that there is some plausibility to the argument that we should allow people to make bad decisions. Namely, I think that there is a certain degree of utility people have in making the correct decision “freely” that is not present for people who are “coerced” (e.g., via some tax or law). However, this utility ultimately depends on the subjectivity of the individual. For example, I think my decision to not smoke is a free decision even though governments have placed a tax on tobacco. I do not think that the extra utility I would gain from deciding not to smoke if I were completely “free” (in the libertarian sense) would be much greater than it is now. In many cases, such as the one I just mentioned, the marginal difference in utility between a paternalistic and non-paternalistic policy is insignificant.
But that’s not even the point. When there is an insurance market, people who engage in risky behavior impose external costs on others in the same market. This is true in both the private market and in government based systems. In the private market, insurance companies impose fees on individuals who choose to engage in risky behavior, e.g., smoking tobacco or speeding in your car. Usually, libertarians do not object to these additional fees or premiums. Why then is it any different for the government to impose additional fees (taxes) on risky behaviors that impose additional costs to the system? In principle, they are the same.
As a side note, I think a system of Pigouvian taxes is much preferable to the current system of taxes (e.g., income, capital gains, etc.). There would be nothing I would be more excited about than a shift to taxes on carbon, tobacco, alcohol, drugs, prostitution, fatty foods, etc. rather than income and investment.
I will end with one of my favorite quotes from Isaiah Berlin: “Freedom for the wolves means death for the sheep.” Freedom is not a good-in-itself; it is only a means to a greater end.
Comment by Andrew Hanson — September 20, 2009 @ 12:32 p.m.
Andrew,
I don’t think the argument you cite is the first one that would occur to a Libertarian. Let me replace your strawman with one of my own!
Making people free to face the consequences of their actions should lead to better choices in the future, according to Libertarian thought. If people touch a hot stove and get burned, they will not touch it in the future- the burned hand teaches best. If we divorce bad consequences from bad decisions, people may very well just continue to make bad decisions.
You should be familiar with this argument, as it is similar to the ones made about the bailout and moral hazard.
Comment by David C. Miller — September 20, 2009 @ 1:17 p.m.
Christine,
“In the process of writing this reply, I tried (unsuccessfully) to find a politically correct way to say that I don’t care what other individuals do, I just don’t to be held responsible for the medical bills that result from their bad decisions.”
First: Barack Obama says that we are our brother’s keeper. We are our sister’s keeper. Yes we can! Yes we can!
Second: Isn’t this argument actually in favor of taxes on soda and cigarettes? Instead of YOU paying for someone else’s chemotherapy, THEY will pay for it through these targeted taxes. If you don’t smoke, you don’t pay the taxes. If you do, you do.
Comment by David C. Miller — September 20, 2009 @ 1:26 p.m.
Shifting current taxes to carbon, tobacco, alcohol, drugs, prostitution, and fatty foods? If only you knew how great a degree of utility I derive from consuming drugs and alcohol with prostitutes in the back of my gas-guzzling van…
Andrew, I gather from your comments that you are, as a rule, in favor of paternalistic policies that help people make the right decisions when they are irresponsible and irrational. The problem is that a paternalistic force is just as vulnerable to committing crimes of irresponsibility and irrationality. Paternalism works by fixing centers of value (normative assessments) that are essentially arbitrary. In doing so, paternalism aggregates preferences in a far more inefficient manner than a system predicated on individual freedom.
Comment by A — September 21, 2009 @ 4:34 p.m.
A, if that really is your name,
Are these normative assessments really all that arbitrary? The Thought Police aren’t out making the rounds to make sure you wear a purple hat on the second Saturday of the month. Nor are they sending jack-booted government thugs to your house to make sure you are loving and kind to your spouse or family.
The reasoning behind these arguments is hardly irrational. After many studies and consultations with medical professionals, we’re pretty sure that smoking leads to medical problems and that society has to pay those medical bills. The argument in favor of a carbon tax is also based on scientific consensus- pollution is costly, and without targeted taxes, everybody ends up footing the bill.
I suppose you could argue that the choice of which vices to tax is arbitrary, and I do worry about the regressive nature of some of these taxes. A ’sin tax’ can end up being a tax on the sins of the poor- intemperance, lust- rather than on the sins of the wealthy- greed, envy.
Comment by David C. Miller — September 22, 2009 @ 10:08 a.m.
I share your concerns regarding the selection of vices to limit and the regressive nature of these taxes.
My point about arbitrary normative assessments is that its difficult if not impossible for a central authority to efficiently aggregate utility. Smoking is injurious to health, and society ‘may’ end up footing the bill, but its not definitively clear to me that the aggregate utility of one scenario (central authority curbing smoking) is greater or lesser than the opposing scenario. When a central authority purports to tax some vice with the raison d’etre of internalizing an externality, it is at best guessing what the sum value of preferences is – arbitrary.
Comment by A — September 22, 2009 @ 2:28 p.m.
What
Abhi?A is getting at, but not saying outright is: People enjoy smoking. We can democratically decree that they not be allowed to do so, but that assumes we are performing cost-benefit analysis better than they. Some people may be willing to trade future high medical bills and shorter life for the enjoyment they get from smoking today. Provided the costs are internalized (and they largely would be, especially in the absence of socialized healthcare) there is nothing wrong with permitting people to decide to smoke.Comment by Josh Smith — September 23, 2009 @ 9:45 a.m.
A,
Although I support pigouvian taxes in theory, I think that they are difficult to put into practice. Josh pointed out that Pigouvian taxes assume that there is perfect information and zero transaction costs. Unless the central authority knows what the optimal value is, then it is disrupting the market by creating an artificial oversupply or shortage. The central authority creates more problems simply by getting involved.
Let me know when you figure out that non-farm payroll data.
Comment by Christine Harbin — September 23, 2009 @ 9:52 a.m.
A, if that is your real name,
Nope, I’m not in favor of paternalistic policies as a rule. I am in favor of paternalistic policies (or any policy for that matter) if and only if they benefit the general welfare.
I disagree that paternalistic policies set centers of value that are necessarily arbitrary. I think David convincingly established that point well. I disagree that paternalistic policies are far more inefficient than a system predicated on individual freedom, especially in the case of Pigouvian taxes.
I agree that it is difficult for a central authority to aggregate utility efficiently. I think that paternalistic policies are necessary for an efficient outcome in cases where there clearly are externalities. This should only need a basic level of analysis to be clear. As an aside, I disagree that efficiency is the best social goal. Inefficient outcomes can easily be construed as better than efficient outcomes with a simple thought experiment.
I don’t think your argument that normative assessments amount to guesswork is very good or supported by evidence or analysis. Cost-benefit analyses don’t involve guesswork. They are very thorough and carefully concocted. There are, of course, still epistemological problems with cost-benefit analyses, but suggesting they are guesswork or pulled out of thin air is a straw man. In any case, it seems as though you aren’t arguing that there shouldn’t be a tax or subsidy in the case of externalities because it’s bad policy, but because cost-benefit analysis isn’t an exact science. That’s analogous to arguing that we shouldn’t travel space because we don’t have a unified field theory.
Josh, and I’m pretty sure that’s your real name,
Yep, I’m pretty confident that I’m better at doing a cost-benefit analysis for a person with a physical addiction than he or she might be. The best reason is that I’m disinterested in the short-term, whereas the person with the physical addiction has a really difficult time calculating long-term costs. They only see the pain and agony of withdrawal they would have to go through if they were to quit. Most drug addicts do not rid themselves of their addiction without some sort of “paternalistic” outside help. But, I think its reasonable to say that some people do benefit from quitting drugs. Recovering addicts readily admit this themselves. Physical addiction is probably the best example of paternalism resulting in positive outcomes.
Of course, this all rests on the seemingly implausible assumption that some people are better doing cost-benefit analyses than others.
Comment by Andrew Hanson — September 23, 2009 @ 9:04 p.m.
I’d like to point out a couple of arguments I’ve made on this very blog that address some of the discussion happening in this comment thread.
“The Economic Impact of Smoking Bans”:
“The Fatted Gaffe”:
More to the point for this thread, as I recently rewatched David Levine’s remarks at our July 31 Milton Friedman event, his point about the regulation of financial markets reminded me that health markets face a similar pitfall.
Levine observed that when the government subsidizes investment failures, it provides an incentive for investors to pursue riskier strategies. High-risk/high-yield investments can result in bigger payoffs if they succeed — but if they fail, they know that somebody else will pick up the tab. I doubt Milton Friedman would have wanted to further regulate financial markets in order to avoid this pitfall; rather, the best course of action for efficient investment allocation would be to eliminate the subsidy that encourages riskier behavior than investors would be willing to undertake on their own.
Similarly, if the government picks up the tab to care for people who’ve made poor personal health choices, this provides a marginal incentive for people to worry less about maintaining their own health in the face of unhealthy short-term payoffs, like the pleasure that comes from consuming cigarettes or doughnuts. So, in the same way that we see increasing calls for tighter regulation of Wall Street, we also see calls for increasing nutritional paternalism.
Government intervention begets more government intervention; there’s no end to that slippery slope. Better instead to toss out newly proposed regulations and eliminate the subsidies that made those regulations seem necessary in the first place.
In other words, the government has no place designing policy that attempts to internalize the externalities that its policies created.
It’s especially dangerous to let the government cement in legislation a platform of politically tainted “scientific” conventional wisdom when consensus within the actual scientific community is controversial and tenuous at best.
Comment by Eric D. Dixon — September 24, 2009 @ 7:56 p.m.
There are two key issues that are likely the cause of our disagreement. You “revealed” one of them here (pun very much intended). I’ll reveal the other here, but they go hand in hand.
The first is your acceptance of revealed preference theory. It seems as though you accept it merely because it is economics, or perhaps its intuitive plausibility. I think revealed preference theory is problematic in several ways. I think the layman’s notion is that individuals have a set of beliefs, preferences and choices. Revealed preference theory makes no distinction between individuals preferences and choices, and says not only that people always believe that their choices will result in the greatest amount of utility, but that their beliefs are always correct. It makes no distinction between the three. I think it’s more plausible to keep beliefs, preferences, and choices distinct. My view is that individuals make choices that are informed by their preferences and beliefs, but their preferences and choices are not always the same. For example, an individual may have a preference for making money in the stock market, a belief that Apple is a profitable stock, and a choice to buy stock in Apple. Additionally, keeping them distinct allows for the possibility of individuals making choices that do not maximally satisfy their preferences.
Secondly, revealed preference theory, and I think most of the libertarian’s classical economics view is that utility is simply the satisfaction of preferences. I think this is misleading (though it may seem intuitively plausible). To suggest that individuals always prefer what is good for them is beyond extreme. I don’t think it’s absurd to claim that giving welfare recipients food, housing, and health care is good for them, even when you consider the infringement on freedom, i.e., individuals being forced to consume more goods than they would otherwise choose. In the same vein, I believe it is foolish to assume that because crack dealers choose to consume crack over health care, that crack is, in fact, better for them than health care. My point is that the “economist’s” definition of utility as satisfaction of preferences does not capture welfare/well-being adequately. The latter is, in my view, a superior moral consideration.
I actually think we have a decent grasp of what is good for people and what isn’t. Humans are more similar than we make them out to be. Martha Nussbaum put together an adequate, but incomplete list of welfare considerations: being able to live to the end of a human life, bodily health, bodily integrity, being able to use the senses extensively, forming emotional attachments to others, using practical reason, forming social affiliations as well as affiliations with other species, play, and control over one’s environment.
Comment by Andrew Hanson — September 24, 2009 @ 11:20 p.m.
Andrew, I can tell you care a lot about the issues on which you write, as well as what I reluctantly will call the general welfare.
It is almost certainly the case that some people consume things that are not good for them. But I am not willing to say that they are not choosing what they prefer. What is even meant by “good for them?” I wish there were objective standards of quality of life, I can find a problem with all of Martha Nussbaum’s items that don’t represent the “negative rights” protected by the constitution. However, there are reasons to choose freedom and private property over authority and socialized/public property.
Cost-Benefit Analysis is never simple. Our hope is to internalize costs to the individuals and groups that garner the benefits which those costs countervail, so as to make the CBA as simple as we can. Another problem is information asymmetry. We want people and businesses to be as transparent as possible, but we also want to respect privacy.
I want the poor to eat, be clothed and cared for, and have a roof over their head. I also recognize that the problem of overconsumption in the presence of subsidies means that there will be less of these scarce resources available for those who need it most. Competition and private property rights are the best tools we have for increasing product quality and reducing price. We owe it to the poor to allow markets to provide for them.
Comment by Josh Smith — September 29, 2009 @ 9:40 a.m.
why should society pay the costs of smokers’ healthcare? why institutionalize externalities?
as for smoking being an irrational choice, I theorize this:
an individual who trains their body to be on par with olympic athletes will live longer than the same person who just stays “merely” in passable shape. so isnt it irrational to not constantly be striving to become an ideal physical specimin? well no, bc for most ppl the benefit of living those few extra years is not worth all the time invested during their “normal” lifespan. bc sheer length of life is not an absolute measurement, and it does bear costs to achieve.
so whats the difference between enjoying smoking, and enjoying [anything other than not working out hours per day] both will cost you some life.
I enjoy smoking. I fully expect to pay some additional health costs down the road. most importantly, if those costs are prohibitive for me personally, I recognize and am prepared for the fact, that means I will die.
Comment by vroman — September 29, 2009 @ 12:06 p.m.
Josh,
My point about revealed preference theory is not that, in making choices, people are not choosing what they prefer, but that there is a meaningful distinction between one’s preference, one’s choice, and what is, in fact, good for her. Preferences can often be construed as ends or goals such as the preference for good health, a long life, or hedonistic pleasure. Choices are more specific, i.e., the decisions one can make to fulfill her ends. Additionally, one’s preferences and choices are informed by her beliefs. As you noted, information asymmetry is problematic, and individual’s preferences and choices are often based on false beliefs. In these cases, the satisfaction of preferences often does not increase utility.
On the meaning of “good for them”: I agree, and I think your point is a good one as far as the meaning of what is good for a person, and the inherent subjectivity associated with it. I derive pleasure from playing tennis, chess, and reading philosophy, but I certainly don’t expect my 6th graders to do the same. They read comics and draw. Nevertheless, without getting deep into the philosophy behind a “good life”, it will suffice to say that the fact that the answer to what a good life entails is complicated does not mean that there is no good answer at all.
I actually think Nussbaum’s list is able to capture some negative rights well: bodily integrity/autonomy as well as control over one’s environment–the right to move about freely, speak one’s mind, etc. Again, though the list is not exhaustive, it does capture a lot of the sorts of things people derive utility from. If the negative rights protected by the constitution are indeed morally justifiable as law (and I believe them to be), it is because they create institutions that benefit the general welfare, NOT because freedom from government is some right “endowed by the creator” (if you are a theist).
I agree that cost-benefit analysis is complex and controversial. I still think it is the best tool we currently have available for crafting social policy.
I disagree with your analysis on food, clothing, and shelter. I think a “guns or butter” analysis is better in this case. It’s true that food, clothing, and shelter are scarce (there is some limit to how much is produced), but they aren’t RELATIVELY scarce. We could produce more if we decided to stop producing, say, BMWs and Cadillacs. If more consumption results in greater overall utility, then it’s not overconsumption, though it may be construed that way in some equilibrium analyses. If food, shelter, or clothing results in greater per unit marginal utility than BMWs or Cadillacs, then to get to the socially optimal frontier, we need to produce more of the former, though I agree, prices will likely rise.
Though I disagree with your assumptions and analysis, I agree with your statement that “Competition and private property rights are the best tools we have for increasing product quality and reducing price.” I’m sorry if it seemed as though I came out against either, but, in fact, I favor both.
I appreciate your concern for the poor and respect your view. We probably agree that a lot of policies, e.g., minimum wage, employer insurance mandate, that are politically construed to help the poor do more harm than good.
Comment by Andrew Hanson — September 30, 2009 @ 6:19 a.m.
vroman,
I didn’t really understand what you meant by “why institutionalize externalities?”, but here’s the econ 101 logic I found using my Google machine.
http://www.env-econ.net/negative-externality.html
I don’t think anyone said smoking was an irrational choice, though I may have missed it (it’s a long thread). I think we should be more careful when talking about “rationality.” Economists have a very particular notion of rationality, which is different from the biologist’s and layman’s definition. It is impossible to determine whether smoking itself is irrational using the economist’s definition; that depends on the individual’s preferences.
The logic behind discouraging smoking isn’t necessarily based on the individual who chooses to smoke’s well-being, but the well-being of those who choose not to smoke, but are affected by the external costs. Your decision to smoke costs affects me and others negatively; however, the market doesn’t account for this cost when it sets the price on tobacco; that is the justification for tobacco taxes. You don’t seem to dispute that point since your analysis is based on your individual choice to smoke (and your amusing comparison to an olympic athlete! haha).
I think that your belief, which is aligned to what Josh and A (if that is his real name) have said previously on this thread, that because you have personally calculated the costs and benefits to yourself over the course of a lifetime, and have determined that the hedonistic benefit of smoking tobacco is greater than the cost of risking emphysema/lung cancer, carries a lot of weight. It doesn’t affect the externality argument of course (I should not be responsible for your choices), but it does affect how we construct social policy. In my view, it is almost always better to persuade individuals who make choices that are at odds with their own welfare by giving them information instead of coercing them (though there may be exceptions in extreme cases). This is not to suggest that the naive revealed preference analysis carries much weight. As I’ve said, we should reject the equivocation of welfare/well-being and “preference” satisfaction. But, an individual’s welfare is inherently tied up in her ability to exercise control over her environment, her person, etc. In doing welfare calculations, we must consider whether decisions are made “freely” or coerced.
Ceterus paribus, “free” decisions are better than coercion. But whether a decision is considered to be free also depends on the subjectivity of the individual. Though there is a degree of “coercion” involved, I still think my choice to smoke or not smoke is a free one. And because I do not perceive that I am being coerced, it does not affect my utility whatsoever. These are tricky issues, of course. If I were a smoker who decided to quit because of high cigarette prices, perhaps I would feel the government was forcing me to do so…
Comment by Andrew Hanson — September 30, 2009 @ 8:53 p.m.
Andy,
You write:
“In my view, it is almost always better to persuade individuals who make choices that are at odds with their own welfare by giving them information instead of coercing them (though there may be exceptions in extreme cases).”
Although I agree with this statement by itself (i.e., providing access to information is better than coercion), I disagree vehemently with its assumption that it is OK for a central authority to protect individuals from decisions that it decides are bad. I think that you and I fundamentally disagree on whether a central authority has the right to change the behavior of its citizens.
I believe that a person does not have freedom of choice unless she has the freedom to make bad decisions. I also do not trust a central authority to decide what is a good decision, and then to guide me toward that end.
In the context of human behaviors and their consequences, I don’t think that access to information is a problem. People who chose to smoke or engage in other bad habits have plenty of information. My dad is a practicing cardiologist and he says that his patients will continue to smoke and eat poorly, no matter how much information he provides them. He asserts that the non-interested are unlikely to change.
Let’s say that I had an eating disorder. There is no shortage of information that tells me that this is damaging to my health. I know fully well that it’s a bad decision. However, the utility I derive from staying skinny is much greater than the utility that I derive from not not being malnourished and not dying prematurely. I’d rather be skinny and live a short life than be fat and live forever.
(This is vroman’s example, stated alternatively.)
Comment by Christine Harbin — October 1, 2009 @ 11:16 a.m.
Additionally, I think the concept that vroman referenced is “internalizing” externalities.
It’s a well-known concept and it’s used a lot in public policy. Externalities can be internalized through market mechanisms or regulations by a government or by some other central authority.
Cap-and-trade proposals are an example of internalizing the externalities of carbon emmissions, for example.
Your buddy Paul Krugman provides further explanation here:
http://books.google.com/books?id=JgGyX4ocbjcC&pg=PA475&lpg=PA475&dq=internalize+externalities&source=bl&ots=XO8EKoFonq&sig=chD7KrOHrsQoj2N_GAtxUSCYjuU&hl=en&ei=3djESuSGEoSX8AaVxZw_&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10#v=onepage&q=internalize%20externalities&f=false
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externality
Comment by Christine Harbin — October 1, 2009 @ 11:40 a.m.
Christine (let’s keep it professional here and use full names),
I actually think you’re wrong about your own beliefs. You say:
“I think that you and I fundamentally disagree on whether a central authority has the right to change the behavior of its citizens.”
Does a central authority have the right to change the behavior of its citizens? Of course. For example, in the absence of property rights, individuals would likely steal at a much greater rate. In the absence of laws against slavery, slaves would be held at a much greater rate. Any non-trivial law that exists changes the behavior of its citizens.
In any case, I don’t accept that you actually believe the government shouldn’t be allowed to create laws. You probably believe something more like “Government shouldn’t be able to create laws to protect people against themselves.” Whether or not that is a defensible position depends upon the grounds you are arguing from. I need to know, first, what makes you think one position better than other, i.e., what your fundamental value is. I’ve already established mine: one policy is better than another if it has a greater positive impact on the general welfare. Until I know what the basis of your judging that free decisions that negatively impact welfare are always better than coerced or informed decisions that positively impact welfare is, we will not be able to reconcile our views.
You say:
“I believe that a person does not have freedom of choice unless she has the freedom to make bad decisions.”
I say: so what? What’s so great about the freedom to make bad decisions? When my decisions are uninformed, I try as hard as I can to outsource them to someone who knows better than I do. For example, rather than selecting my own wardrobe, I let my girlfriend tell me what she thinks looks good. I accept that she probably knows better than me, and that it will result in a better outcome, and that’s all I really care about. In the case where I make every decision on my own, sure, I guess I’d learn how to dress well somewhere down the line. But why should I use the inefficient “learn from your mistakes” method, when I can just fast track my way to the better outcome by outsourcing?
You’re crazy if you think people are well-informed. Take any scientific study of public knowledge. You will believe otherwise. An insignificant minority knew smoking was bad for them before the surgeon general’s warning. People barely believed nicotine was addictive before the 1990s. We just found out a few years ago that trans fats are bad. Some people, even on this thread, have argued that fats aren’t bad for your health.
I think it’s ironic that in your original post, you were advising that the best thing people can do save on costs is to reform their unhealthy habits. Now you’re saying that their decisions are actually responsible ones, since they have calculated the costs of living unhealthily and determined that they are worth the risk. Everyone is equally responsible, I guess.
An eating disorder is another case (aside from physical addiction) where I think it is morally permissible to coerce a person into getting treatment, though it is better to begin with persuasion and giving information. Coercion should always be used as a last resort.
I know what internalizing externalities means. That’s why I posted a link in my comment. I said I wasn’t sure what “institutionalizing externalities” meant.
For the record, Paul Krugman and I are not buddies. But, he is a well-respected economist, and his views should be taken seriously.
Comment by Andrew Hanson — October 1, 2009 @ 2:26 p.m.
Christine,
Your father is a cardiologist. Mine is a psychologist. Anorexia nervosa is a psychological condition, not some Randian lifestyle choice. There are genetic components to it, as well as environmental factors such as exposure to a high-fat/high-sugar diet early in development.
No one develops anorexia nervosa as a result of some cost-benefit analysis that they do in their head. To suggest otherwise is, frankly, exactly the sort of libertarian view that I find morally abhorrent.
Comment by David C. Miller — October 4, 2009 @ 10:58 p.m.
Vroman,
“why should society pay the costs of smokers’ healthcare? why institutionalize externalities?
…
I enjoy smoking. I fully expect to pay some additional health costs down the road. most importantly, if those costs are prohibitive for me personally, I recognize and am prepared for the fact, that means I will die.”
Putting aside the fact that the system that Andrew and I are advocating explicitly attempts to internalize the externality rather than institutionalizing (or socializing) it…
Really? Really? I’ve never met you and I can’t judge your character over one post on the Internet, but you would calmly accept your death if it was cost prohibitive? It’s certainly gutsy and admirable in its own way, but I just don’t think we can design public policy by expecting human beings to act the way you say you will.
Comment by David C. Miller — October 4, 2009 @ 11:15 p.m.
Andy (I see no reason to keep the names professional. Are we not all friends here?),
You advocate for public policies that will produce the greatest general welfare, and you have laid out an inkling of what that entails, but I take issue, once again. The General Welfare is a tricky concept. Hard to define precisely, and improvements are hard to measure or even achieve with concerted effort. It is a matter of incentives. I can support measures which create incentives for individuals to improve themselves, that internalize benefits as well as costs. When society shares in the costs of it’s component members’ problems, there becomes less incentive to avoid disaster. And I don’t believe that it is the slightest bit inconsistent for Chrissy to advocate for private, personal testimony to change people’s minds and an absence of public involvement in the same.
Regarding whether there is or is not a good life or a life well-lived: there is not just one. There is an abundance of good lives. There are so many choices with so many virtuous or respectable options that it is possible for everyone to live differently and all to have lived well. I place a high import on not harming others, however. This is the seat of the “negative rights” that I champion.
Regarding guns v butter or BMWs v Oatmeal: there are two problems with what I am reading as your assertion. One is that the calculation of “what is to be produced in society” is not better performed by any individual or group than it is by society itself in a free market with a price system. I recommend Hayek for more on this. The second problem is that if you wish for a system with the authority to determine what shall be produced it is difficult (some say impossible, and history bears this out) to keep the worst of humanity from seizing the reins. See Hayek for more on this as well. :)
In particular, check out The Road to Serfdom if you haven’t already. And for historical examples check out certain instances in the twentieth century in Russia, Germany, Italy, Cambodia, China, et al.
Dave,
First of all, from what I’ve read, you and Andy are not advocating for internalizing externalities. Second, when it comes to Vroman, he is more committed and rational than you imagine.
And there’s nothing strange about his choice. Remember that there is a cognitive disconnect between each person on the planet and each other person on the planet. We can not experience their time and place, nor can we relate to it particularly well. There are in fact many people on earth who are close to death and prepared to accept it. A life well lived is a blessing, and the ability to bid farewell to the wondrous world we know on earth is a personal choice, the calculations for which we cannot fathom for anyone but ourselves. I say this, but right now I admit I am counting on slightly above average healthy living and futurist medical technology to allow me to live forever.
Comment by Josh Smith — October 5, 2009 @ 12:20 p.m.
Josh,
Andrew has expressed support for Pigouvian taxes:
Andrew in Comment 4:
“As a side note, I think a system of Pigouvian taxes is much preferable to the current system of taxes (e.g., income, capital gains, etc.). There would be nothing I would be more excited about than a shift to taxes on carbon, tobacco, alcohol, drugs, prostitution, fatty foods, etc. rather than income and investment.”
My thoughts are partly shown in comments 6 and 8:
“Second: Isn’t this argument actually in favor of taxes on soda and cigarettes? Instead of YOU paying for someone else’s chemotherapy, THEY will pay for it through these targeted taxes. If you don’t smoke, you don’t pay the taxes. If you do, you do.”
…
“The reasoning behind these arguments is hardly irrational. After many studies and consultations with medical professionals, we’re pretty sure that smoking leads to medical problems and that society has to pay those medical bills. The argument in favor of a carbon tax is also based on scientific consensus- pollution is costly, and without targeted taxes, everybody ends up footing the bill.”
So, to be clear: I support internalizing these externalities using a system of targeted taxes. I believe that a central authority is in a better position to determine where these externalities exist and how much to value them because:
1. Central authorities have access to better information and process it better. I do not expect an individual to be versed in biochemistry or actuarial science. A government body does have those resources.
2. Human beings by their very nature will make mistakes. Central authorities, being composed of fallible human beings themselves, will also make mistakes. So you have to decide whose mistakes will be larger. You cite Hayek and point to the histories of the Soviet Union, Cambodia, and China as evidence that the mistakes of central planning are larger than those of individuals, but I think we can find a happy medium somewhere between complete anarchy and state property for the EPA, FDA, SEC, Federal Reserve, and other institutions to do their job well.
3. The nature of the substances involved many times makes people unable to rationally evaluate them. Many people don’t make the decision to smoke solely because they think it is in their rational self-interest; they are physically addicted to nicotine. There is a physical reason why humans enjoy eating many fats and sugars.
4. Finally, it may very well be that individuals acting in their own rational self-interest take actions that hurt the general welfare. The owners of a factory get all of the benefits, but pay only a fraction of the true costs of air pollution. Or we could do another example: perhaps it would be worthwhile to examine the old saw of the Tragedy of the Commons. I hesitate to put words in Andrew’s mouth, but I think one common approach to solve the problem that we would endorse is to form a central authority to regulate access to the commons.
On a side note, I intend to live forever, even though I die.
Comment by David C. Miller — October 5, 2009 @ 4:38 p.m.
Yeah! Let’s keep this thread going!
Josh (I guess we can use abbreviated names, but professionalism should not be taken lightly),
I enjoyed your well-thought out comment and appreciate where you are coming from. I still think your analysis is flawed, however.
I think it is important to spell out exactly what you are arguing (or seem to be arguing) so we can get to the heart of this issue.
Argument 1
(1) The general welfare is tricky and hard to define precisely; improvements in the general welfare are hard to measure. (assertion)
(2) Improvements in the general welfare are hard to achieve (with concerted effort). (assertion)
(3) Our aim should not be to improve the general welfare? (from 2 and 3)
Argument 2
(1) Policies that create incentives to improve their own welfare are permissible (assertion)
(2) Policies that internalize costs and benefits are permissible (assertion)
(3) When society spreads/shares cost, incentives to improve welfare are diminished (assertion)
(4) We should avoid disaster (implied)
(5) We should not spread or share cost (from 3 and 4)
Argument 3
(1) There are many different morally permissible lives with many different choices that allow for a “good life” (assertion)
(2) Harming others is not permissible (assertion)
(3) Negative rights are important (assertion)
Argument 4
(1) Individuals and groups are better at determining what is produced than societies, i.e., market systems are better than centrally planned systems (assertion)
(2) Hayek namedrop (Hayek)
(3) Road to Serfdom book title drop (Hayek)
Ok, those are the four as I see it. I would like to note that only in argument 2 did you use any form of logical reasoning or have a conclusion that follows from premises. You’re probably thinking of the arguments in your head, but not spelling them out, so it’s really difficult to analyze where you’re coming from.
Let’s start with argument 1. Premise (1) is true. Premise (2) is may be false or trivial. Take your pick. The point is (3) doesn’t follow if that’s what you meant the argument to show. The fact that something is tricky to measure or define precisely, or that it’s hard to measure improvements to the goal DOES NOT entail that the goal is an unworthy one. It’s my view that science should aim to purport true theories. It has been almost impossible to do in the past, and it’s really difficult to tell if one theory is better than another, especially in the case of paradigm shift. But that doesn’t mean that we should stop aiming to figure out how the world really works. It’s without question a worthy enterprise. Milton Friedman argued that the goal of economics ought to be predictive accuracy. Economics is awful at prediction. It’s a tricky business: analyzing and predicting the behavior of humans; but that doesn’t mean economics isn’t an important discipline, or we should stop doing economic analyses, or even that prediction isn’t a worthy aim.
Argument 2 is the most interesting of the 4. (1), (2), and (4) are true. (3) is controversial. Elaborate more on that. It may be true depending on what you mean. Systems that place the greatest responsibility on the individual do not always result in the greatest amount of welfare. For example, consider a policy that mandates that wooden stakes are installed at the center of steering wheels. This would, of course, provide a great incentive for individuals to be cautious and safe when they are driving. However, this policy would also result in a lot of individuals deciding not to drive, and even more individuals becoming incredibly anxious when they drive. Sure, there would probably be less care accidents, but I expect that, c.p., the aggregate utility would decrease, even though incentives for driving safely have increased.
In any case, David and I have merely argued that externalities should be internalized to increase aggregate welfare or utility, and you seem to have accepted that (1 and 2).
Argument 3 is really no argument at all. It’s trivially true that there are many different choices that constitute a good life. You’ll get no disagreement from me on that one. However, it’s also true that people can act in their disinterest. That was my point.
Argument 4 is also not really an argument. Premise 1 is a good assertion but nothing follows from it. I agree that markets are far superior to centrally planned systems at determining what should be produced. I have absolutely no idea how that comes into play in our discussion. I have not read Road to Serfdom, but I am familiar with Hayek’s ideas and arguments. I though we were talking about petroleum (i.e., externalities, personal responsibility, and paternalism). However, I think libertarians usually have a naive view of history. It’s true that the 20th century proved communism/socialism is inept, but it’s also true that the 19th century proved the same thing about unrestricted markets.
Comment by Andrew Hanson — October 5, 2009 @ 4:55 p.m.
First, re: revealed preference, I don’t “accept it because it’s economics,” but almost the reverse. I accept economics largely because it places such an emphasis on revealed preference. This is not to say that people’s choices are a good guide to what they inherently want — they fall drastically short in that regard — but because there’s no better tool to get us closer to inherent wants in an aggregate sense. Cf. David Friedman: “It is not a very good solution. It is merely, for many although not all purposes, better than any alternative that anyone has come up with since.”
I can concede it might be possible to observe and interview a particular person carefully over a span of months or years and develop a set of paternalistic policies that would increase that one person’s utility for the short-term time period in which that person’s inherent preferences remain largely the same (leaving aside the probable counterbalance of decreased utility resulting merely from the coercive imposition itself, regardless of results). This possibility might even hold true for a small, relatively homogeneous group of people, if your policies strictly address only their commonalities. But for more than that, let alone an entire state or nation? It’s not only foolish to attempt, but infinitesimally improbable to execute. You think you can better calculate cost-benefit for the lifestyle choices of hundreds of thousands of people in aggregate? No, you can’t. Not without having a detailed, exhaustive, ongoing window into every one of their minds.
Trotting out a list of general welfare considerations from a philosopher you like isn’t an argument. It looks like a list of pretty beneficial things to me, too — perhaps even universally beneficial. The problem is that everybody prefers each of those items in wildly different proportions. Promoting any particular item on that list for some group of people comes at a resource cost that will diminish other items on that list for other groups of people (even leaving aside the dead-weight resource loss that the attempt would entail). No set of policies will maximize the utility that those items bring — not even complete laissez-faire. But laissez-faire gets us closer precisely because central authorities don’t have better information. They have worse.
Incorrect beliefs are a big problem, because they compound disutility. Education is a noble goal for that reason. But nowhere are incorrect beliefs more problematic than when they’re wielded by central authorities who don’t know that they’re incorrect. This is a particularly dangerous trap, as public choice theorists would be quick to remind us, because although it’s true that incorrect beliefs pervade markets, incorrect beliefs are more likely to rise to the top in political frameworks than in market frameworks, because the competitive process that might help winnow them out is either severely hampered or entirely nonexistent in public spheres. Central authorities can’t function as correctives for failed markets, because those central authorities are more likely to fail, and on an even larger scale. Cf. Arnold Kling: “Markets fail. Use markets.”
Earlier, you said that “Some people, even on this thread, have argued that fats aren’t bad for your health.” I didn’t see anybody make that argument here, but it serves as an excellent example of how entrenched political bias leads to the propagation of incorrect beliefs on an enormous scale, cemented in paternal policies that decrease utility for hundreds of millions of people. From Overcoming Bias:
The USDA just wants people to be healthier, right? But, based on the preponderence of actual scientific evidence that policymakers have ignored, it appears they’ve been promoting an unhealthy diet for decades. It may well turn out that the extensive scientific literature that Gary Taubes collated is itself incorrect, although at this point the evidence seems to be solidly in his favor. But the pursuit of truth is done no favors by a central authority that cheerleads for the team it picked based on political considerations (rent-seeking, dispersed costs/concentrated benefits, altruism based on incorrect beliefs, etc.). Markets fail, sure. Central authorities fail spectacularly.
You don’t quite seem to understand Milton Friedman’s argument that economics should be a tool for prediction. He was the first to point out that any economist is working with an incomplete and often incorrect set of data, just as central planners do, so major economic catastrophes can’t be pinned down with precision in advance. Prediction in economics is more about formulating a theory and applying it to a more complete dataset from the past:
One more point. While Paul Krugman’s old academic work about the benefits of globalization is rightly respected by other economists, his modern punditry doesn’t fare nearly as well.
Final point: Your own view of the 19th century is much more naive than Josh’s.
Comment by Eric D. Dixon — October 5, 2009 @ 7:03 p.m.
Andy,
Here is my shot at improving the structure of my previous arguments as you have arranged them:
Argument 1 – On promoting the general welfare
(1) poverty is the natural state of things (unless you are in Eden)
(2) voluntary trade reduces poverty (by making both parties marginally wealthier with each trade)
(3) competition increases the efficiency of trade (by rewarding beneficial innovation and guiding producers toward more efficient arrangements)
(4) regulating trade reduces the efficiency of trade (with incredibly limited exception, namely protection of property rights and protection from fraud)
(5) in order to promote the most welfare, public policies should aim for increasing the efficiency of trade which typically means laissez-faire
Argument 2 – On internalizing costs:
(1) People act in their own self interest (a broad assertion, but supportable in many ways)
(2) People maximize personal benefit and minimize personal loss (a particular form of self interest)
(3) When people face the possibility of loss in exchange for a gain, they balance it against it’s magnitude and likelihood (expected value calculation)
(4) When the loss is borne by someone other than the person who faces the gain, it is likely to be risked, regardless of magnitude or likelihood. (the notion of an externality)
(5) Externalizing costs decreases overall welfare by reducing incentives to balance costs against benefits.
(5) If we wish to improve overall welfare, we should not share or spread costs, and should work to internalize externalities.
Argument 3 – In defense of negative rights above all other rights:
(1) I do not want to be harmed. (personal preference)
(2) A double standard of behavior for myself and others is unfair or unjust. (admittedly depends on one’s definitions of fair and just)
(3) I should not harm anyone. (conclusion given (1) and (2))
(4) enforcement of positive rights will result in infringement of negative rights (If it doesn’t there is no need to think of the positive rights as “rights.” That is, if you don’t need to enforce it, it requires no official sanction)
(5) depending on which positive rights you enforce, you are performing a tradeoff between equality/progressivism and justice
For the record, I am not willing to perform that tradeoff. I believe in regarding all people as equal under the law.
Argument 4 will have to wait. I was intending to refute the idea that a central planner, no matter who she is, would not aptly choose an arrangement that satisfied individual’s preferences as well as a price-guided market. This is a very complex argument and may be unnecessary here.
Comment by Josh Smith — October 14, 2009 @ 12:13 p.m.
I’m working on a response on my blog. Sorry for the delay. I have been busy totaling cars and teaching kids recently. But here are a few of my main areas of discontent with the previous two comments:
1. Economics is not based in revealed preference theory. Revealed preference theory is a failed research program within the field of economics. Perhaps the economists/physicists who have influenced you place emphasis on revealed preference, but the discipline existed long before it, and will continue after economists thoroughly reject it as Amartya Sen, Stanley Wong, and others have. Actually, I think that much of the mistakes libertarians make regarding their political and moral views is wrapped up in them taking revealed preference theory seriously. I encourage you to read Rationality and Freedom and Foundations of Paul Samuelson’s Revealed Preference Theory.
2. Stop equivocating pigovian taxes and central planning. To requote David, “The Thought Police aren’t out making the rounds to make sure you wear a purple hat on the second Saturday of the month. Nor are they sending jack-booted government thugs to your house to make sure you are loving and kind to your spouse or family.”
3. “You think you can better calculate cost-benefit for the lifestyle choices of hundreds of thousands of people in aggregate? No, you can’t. ” Yes, I can.
4. Markets fail. Use markets. Correct market failures. Advance utility. Reach the Pareto frontier!
5. We must use CBA. And we do it all the time. Should we have a zero tolerance drinking and driving policy for individuals of ages 18-21? The evidence shows that creating a law that prevents teenagers from drinking and driving up to the legal limit will save 100,000 lives a year. Is the 100,000 lives saved worth the costs imposed on the government, taxpayers, and teenage drinkers? I’m not sure, but I know CBA is the best tool we have for crafting social policy. CBA fails. Use CBA.
6. Science is…whatever we want it to be. It seems like your and his criticism is directed more at the scientific community than the government (though they are obviously connected). Since neither of us are dietitians, we probably can’t speak expertly about which theory is correct and why. But, as I recall from my college chemistry class, there is certainly a theoretical rationale for why saturated fats contribute to obesity. That particular research program may be mistaken, but to argue that the government is responsible for mistaken chemical theories is, ironically, more evidence of your confirmation bias than anything else. Why not point to the success of the Apollo program based on sound physics? ;)
7. I think I understand Milton Friedman’s point about prediction insofar as I previously stated: “Milton Friedman argued that the goal of economics ought to be predictive accuracy.” Unless you want to argue that Friedman wasn’t an instrumentalist? Perhaps the confusion lies in the meaning of the term prediction. As a trained philosopher, we take predictions to mean anything logically entailed by a theory. This includes predictions about the past and future. Friedman, as I interpret him, argued that theories ought to be judged by how well they are able to predict the data.
8. I don’t think that Levine’s punditry on the Huffington Post is evidence that Krugman’s current views are universally disregarded by economists. I’m not sure how it got to the point where we’re arguing about Paul Krugman. All I said was that he is respected and we should take his views seriously. I think it’s almost better in any case to take ideas and arguments seriously rather than dismissing them because of the source. Of course, I make an exception for people like Hannity, Coulter, and Maher.
9. If you’re interested about welfare comparisons between 18th and 19th century, please take a look at this website: http://www.gapminder.org/
@ Josh
Arg. 1. I think your problem is that you’re equating efficiency of trade with maximizing of welfare. It may be true that trade makes people better off, but it doesn’t make people the best off, and it may make some people worse off, for example, when people have mistaken beliefs, or when their preferences and choices don’t align.
Arg. 2. I agree, and I think with a free market the costs are spread, while with a Pigovian tax, they are internalized. For example, taxpayers have to pay the cost for pollution. Under a Pigovian tax, the costs are internalized, the consumer pays for the pollution up front.
Arg. 3. I may not have made sense of this correctly, so you might have to re-explain it to me. I do think you’re wrong.
(1) Everyone should be held to the same standard of morality (assertion)
(2) If positive rights are enforced, the enforcement will infringe on negative rights. (from the def. of rights, neg. rights)
(3) Justice is the enforcement of negative rights. (Your def. of justice)
(4) If negative rights are not enforced, it will result in an unjust state of affairs. (from 3)
(5) The enforcement of positive rights results in equality. (assertion)
(6) For any situation where a positive or cl,aim right is made, there is a tradeoff between justice and equality. (from 2,3,4,5)
(7) Justice is a greater moral consideration than equality. (assertion)
(8) Therefore, negative right warrant greater consideration than negative rights. (from 6,7)
Now that I look at it, you don’t really need premise 1. Anyway, I think your argument fails in a few ways. The most controversial parts of your argument are just made as assertions: 3, 5, and 7. But I won’t need any analysis of those premises to dismiss this argument (though I think those topics are certainly fascinating).
Let’s just look at the language of premise 2: If positive rights are enforced, the enforcement will infringe on negative rights. And now premise 3: Justice is the enforcement of negative rights.
In your view, it seems to be ok to enforce negative rights, but not to enforce positive rights. You reason (2) that enforcing positive rights infringes on negative rights. But this premise is self-defeating! If you think about it, the enforcement of a negative right is itself a positive right, i.e., the citizen’s right to state enforcement. If my negative right is infringed, and there’s no positive right along with it, then there’s no way justice gets done. Fortunately, (2) is wrong. Enforcing positive rights doesn’t necessarily infringe on negative rights. Consider the law enforcement case as an example.
There are many more problems with your argument. Many people construe an deeply unequal state of affairs as unjust. It’s hard to see why a positive/claim right to say, an attorney, results in greater equality and less justice.
I think you need a more adequate theory of justice and rights. See Rawls’ A Theory of Justice ;)
Comment by Andrew Hanson — November 1, 2009 @ 5:04 p.m.
Here’s another great link for comparing advancements in welfare/income/etc. from 19th and 20th centuries:
http://www.measuringworth.org/datasets/usgdp/result.php
Comment by Andrew Hanson — November 7, 2009 @ 10:09 p.m.